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EU Law, International Law and Economic Sanctions against Terrorism: The 
Judiciary in Distress?∗
 
 
Takis Tridimas1 and José A. Gutiérrez-Fons2
Introduction  
 
 
 
 
This article seeks to examine the relationship between European Union law, 
international law, and the protection of fundamental rights in the light of recent case 
law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Court of First Instance (CFI) 
relating to economic sanctions against individuals. On 3 September 2008, the ECJ 
delivered its long-awaited judgment in Kadi and Al Barakaat on appeal from the CFI.3 
In its judgment under appeal,4
                                                        
∗ A final version will be published in the Fordham International Law Journal. 
1 Sir John Lubbock Professor of Banking Law, Queen Mary College, University of London; 
Professor and Distinguished Nancy A. Patterson Scholar, Dickinson School of Law, 
Pennsylvania State University. 
2 Research Fellow, Queen Mary College, University of London.  
3 Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P Kadi & Al Barakaat International Foundation v 
Counciland Commission, judgment of 3 September 2008.   
 the CFI had held that the European Community (EC) 
is competent to adopt regulations imposing economic sanctions against private 
organisations in pursuance of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions seeking to 
combat terrorism; that although the EC is not bound directly by the UN Charter, it is 
bound pursuant to the EC Treaty to respect international law and give effect to 
UNSC; and that the CFI has jurisdiction to examine the compatibility of EC 
regulations implementing UNSC resolutions with fundamental rights not as protected 
by the EC but as protected by jus cogens. On appeal, following the Opinion of 
Maduro AG, the ECJ rejected the CFI’s approach. It held that UNSC resolutions are 
binding only in international law. It subjected the contested regulations to full review 
under EC human rights standards and found them in breach of the right to a hearing, 
the right to judicial protection and the right to property. Kadi and Al Barakaat is the 
most important judgment ever delivered by the ECJ on the relationship between EC 
and international law and one of its most important judgments on fundamental rights. 
It is imbued by constitutional confidence, commitment to the rule of law but also 
some scepticism towards international law. In the meantime, the CFI has delivered a 
number of other judgments on anti-terrorist sanctions assessing the limits of the 
“emergency constitution” at European level. The purpose of this paper is to examine 
the above case law and explore the dilemmas and tensions facing the EU judiciary in 
seeking to define and protect the EU’s distinct constitutional space. It is divided as 
follows. It first looks at the judgment in Kadi. After a short presentation of the factual 
and legal background, it explores the question whether the EU has competence to 
adopt smart sanctions. It then examines whether the EU is bound by resolutions of 
the Security Council, whether the ECJ has jurisdiction to review Community 
measures implementing such resolutions and the applicable standard of judicial 
scrutiny. It analyses the contrasting views of the CFI, the Advocate General, and the 
ECJ taking account also of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR). Further, it explores the consequences of annulling the contested regulation. 
It then turns to discussing CFI case law in relation to sanctions lists drawn up not by 
the UN Security Council but by the EC. The paper concludes by welcoming the 
judgment of the ECJ. Whilst its reasoning on the issue of Community competence is 
questionable, once such competence is established, it is difficult to support the 
4 Case T-315/01 Kadi v Council and Commission [2005] ECR II-3649 Case T-306/01 Yusuf 
and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission [2005] ECR II-3533. 
 3 
abrogation of Community standards for the protection of fundamental rights. Such 
standards should ensure procedural due process whilst recognising the importance 
of public security. 
 
Kadi and Al Barakaat: The factual and legal background to the judgments  
 
Before the collapse of the Taliban regime, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted 
Resolution 1267 (1999)5 and Resolution 1333 (2000)6 which required all Member 
States to freeze the funds and other financial resources owned or controlled by the 
Taliban and their undertakings. By Resolution 1267, the UNSC also decided to 
establish a Sanctions Committee responsible for ensuring that the States would take 
the necessary implementing action. The Sanctions Committee was charged, in 
particular, with the task of drawing up a list of persons and entities whose funds 
would be frozen pursuant to the resolutions. Taking the view that action by the 
Community was necessary to implement these resolutions, the EU Council adopted 
two Common Positions7 under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
which were, in turn, implemented by two Council Regulations8 adopted on the basis 
of Articles 60 and 301 EC.9
After the collapse of the Taliban regime, the UNSC adopted two further resolutions
  
  
10 
which also provided for the freezing of funds but, this time, they were directed against 
Usama bin Laden, members of Al-Qaeda network, and the Taliban. Since they no 
longer controlled the government of Afghanistan, the resolutions in question targeted 
solely non-state actors. Those resolutions were also implemented at EU level. The 
Council adopted two new CFSP common positions11
                                                        
5 Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999), 15 October 1999. 
6 Security Council Resolution 1333 (2000), 19 December 2000. 
7See Council Common Position 1999/727/CFSP, 15 November 1999, concerning restrictive 
measures against the Taliban OJ L 294, 16/11/1999 P. 0001 – 0001; and Council Common 
Position 2001/154/CFSP, 26 February 2001 concerning additional restrictive measures 
against the Taliban and amending Common Position 96/746/CFSP. OJ L 057 , 27/02/2001 P. 
0001 – 0002. 
8 See Council Regulation (EC) No 337/2000 concerning a flight ban and a freeze of funds and 
other financial resources in respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan, OJ 2000 L 43/1; Council 
Regulation (EC) No 467/2001 of 6 March 2001 prohibiting the export of certain goods and 
services to Afghanistan, strengthening the flight ban and extending the freeze of funds and 
other financial resources in respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan, and repealing Regulation 
(EC) No 337/2000. OJ L 067; 09/03/2001 P. 0001 – 0023.  
9 Article 301 EC states as follows: “Where it is provided, in a common position or in a joint 
action adopted according to the provisions of the Treaty on European Union relating to the 
common foreign and security policy, for an action by the Community to interrupt or to reduce, 
in part or completely, economic relations with one or more third countries, the Council shall 
take the necessary urgent measures. The Council shall act by a qualified majority on a 
proposal from the Commission.” 
Article 60(1) EC states as follows: “If, in the cases envisaged in Article 301, action by the 
Community is deemed necessary, the Council may, in accordance with the procedure 
provided for in Article 301, take the necessary urgent measures on the movement of capital 
and on payments as regards the third countries concerned.” 
10 Security Council Resolution 1390 (2002) of 28 January 2002 and Security Council 
Resolution 1453 (2002) of 24 December 2002. 
 which were implemented 
11 Council Common Position  2002/402/CFSP of 27 May 2002 concerning restrictive 
measures against Usama bin Laden, members of the Al-Qaida organisation and the Taliban 
and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them and repealing 
Common Positions 96/746/CFSP, 1999/727/CFSP, 2001/154/CFSP and 2001/771/CFSP OJ 
L 139 , 29/05/2002 P. 0004 – 0005; and Council Common Position 2003/140/CFSP of 27 
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respectively by Council Regulations 881/2002/EC12 and 561/2003/EC13. This time, 
the Council relied as the legal basis for the adoption of the regulations not only on 
Articles 60 and 301 but also on Article 308 EC.14
In Kadi and Yusuf and Barakaat, the applicants were respectively a Saudi Arabian 
national and a Swedish national who had been included in the lists drawn by the UN 
Sanctions Committee and, consequently, in the lists incorporated in implementing 
Community regulations. They brought proceedings before the CFI seeking the 
annulment of those regulations alleging breach of their fundamental rights, namely, 
the right to a fair hearing, the right to respect property, and the right for effective 
judicial review.
 The Sanctions Committee amended 
and supplemented the sanctions list a number of times and, each time, the 
amendments were introduced in Community law by respective amendments to the 
Community regulations. 
 
15 Similar challenges were brought also in other cases.16 Given that 
the key judicial pronouncements were made in Kadi, that judgment will be used as 
the primary point of analysis, with references to the other judgments only where 
necessary to illustrate distinct points made therein. Notably, in Yusuf and Al Barakaat 
the challenge was launched by a Community national, bringing to the fore the fact 
that the contested regulation was the first time that the Community imposed 
economic sanction directly against its own nationals.17
                                                                                                                                                              
February 2003 concerning exceptions to the restrictive measures imposed by Common 
Position 2002/402/CFSP. OJ L 053 , 28/02/2003 P. 0062 – 0062. 
12 Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 of 27 May 2002 imposing certain specific restrictive 
measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the 
Al-Qaida network and the Taliban, and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 467/2001 
prohibiting the export of certain goods and services to Afghanistan, strengthening the flight 
ban and extending the freeze of funds and other financial resources in respect of the Taliban 
of Afghanistan OJ L 139 , 29/05/2002 P. 0009 – 0022. 
13 Council Regulation (EC) No 561/2003 of 27 March 2003 amending, as regards exceptions 
to the freezing of funds and economic resources, Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 imposing 
certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated 
with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban OJ L 082 , 29/03/2003 P. 0001 
– 0002. 
14 Article 308 EC states as follows: “If action by the Community should prove necessary to 
attain, in the course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the 
Community, and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting 
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European 
Parliament, take the appropriate measures”. 
15 Initially, Kadi sought annulment of Regulation 467/2001 as amended by Commission 
Regulation 2062/2001 but, following the repeal of Regulation 467/2001 by Regulation 
881/2002 which took place after the commencement of proceedings, the CFI considered the 
action directed against the new regulation in the interests of the proper administration of 
justice. See Kadi, op.cit., paras 57-58. A similar issue arose in Yusuf and Al Barakaat, op.cit., 
paras 76-77. In the latter case, the ECJ rejected the argument that the contested regulations 
were not proper regulations because they named specific persons and therefore lacked 
general application: see Kadi and Al Barakaat, op.cit, paras 241 et seq. 
16 Case T-253/02 Ayadi v Council, judgment of 12 July 2006; Case T-49/04 Hassan v Council 
and Commission, judgment of 12 July 2006; Case T-362/04 Minin v Council, judgment of 31 
January 2007; Case T-47/03 Sison v Council, judgment of 11 July 2007. 
 
17 In the past, economic sanctions imposed by the Community against third countries may 
have had adverse incidental effects on Community enterprises but never targeted directly 
Community natural or legal persons: see e.g. Case C-124/95 The Queen and HM Treasury ex 
parte Centro-Com [1997] ECR I-81. In  Yusuf and Al Barakaat, op.cit. the CFI confirmed that 
the Council had power to adopt restrictve measures against Community nationals and 
persons established in the Community under Articles 60 and 301: see para 112 of the 
judgment. In Minin, op.cit., the CFI rejected an argument based on extra-territoriality. The 
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EC competence: roofs, pillars and bridges  
 
Although in Kadi the applicants did not raise the issue,18 the CFI examined on its own 
motion whether the Community had competence to adopt economic sanctions 
against non-state actors. In the context of the cases, the issue of competence was 
unusually complex. It will be recalled that the contested regulations were adopted on 
the combined basis of Articles 301, 60 and 308 EC. Article 301 EC fulfils a distinct 
function in the EU architecture. It empowers the Community to take action to serve 
CFSP objectives, thus enabling a transition (passerelle) from the second to the first 
pillar and providing a bridge between inter-governmentalism and Community 
methodology. Action under Article 301 is the result of a two-stage procedure. In the 
first stage, the Council, acting under the CFSP, adopts unanimously a common 
position or a joint action laying down the guidelines that the Community must follow. 
In the second stage, the Council, acting by qualified majority and in its capacity as a 
Community institution, adopts measures, typically in the form of a regulation, which 
translate the political objectives of the CFSP into binding Community legislation. 
Notably, the EC Treaty makes no general provision for the implementation of CFSP 
common positions or joint actions via Community legislation. Economic sanctions are 
in fact the only area where express provision is made for a transition between the 
first and second pillar. Article 301 is the main such passerelle provision,19 defining 
economic sanctions as a “partial or complete interruption or reduction of economic 
relations with one or more third countries”. The provision reveals the sui generis 
ancestry of economic sanctions in EC law which traditionally straddled foreign policy 
and trade relations.20
Since 2000, the Council has adopted a liberal interpretation of Article 301 relying on it 
to adopt smart sanctions, i.e. sanctions targeting individuals and non-state actors. An 
example is provided by the sanctions regime against Mr Milosevic, the former 
President of Yugoslavia. In 1999, in response to constant violations of human rights 
committed by the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), the 
Council took measures against the FRY
 
 
21. In 2000, upon the restoration of 
democracy and the election of a new president, the sanctions against the FRY were 
repealed but were maintained against Mr. Milosevic and his associates as he 
continued to be perceived as a threat to the consolidation of democracy.22
                                                                                                                                                              
applicant argued that the Community may not adopt legislation in relation to conduct 
originating outside the EU unless such conduct produces effects within the EU territory. The 
CFI held that, since the objective of the CFSP is to preserve peace and strengthen 
international security, the Community has power to adopt economic sanctions to counteract 
conduct arising exclusively outside the EU since, otherwise, CFSP objectives could not be 
attained.  
18 The issue of competence was raised by the applicants in Yusuf and Al Barakaat,op.cit and 
also in Ayadi, op.cit., where the applicant raised arguments based on the principle of 
subsidiarity: see below. 
19 Article 60(1) is also a passerelle provision but it is subsidiary to Article 301 since, by its own 
terms, it only applies in the cases envisaged in Article 301 EC. 
20 For a fuller discussion, see P. Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law, Hart, 2006, pp. 
429 et seq. 
21 Council Regulation (EC) No 1294/1999 of 15 June 1999 concerning a freeze of funds and a 
ban on  investment in relation to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and repealing 
Regulations (EC) No 1295/98 and (EC) No 1607/98 Official Journal L 283 , 06/11/1999 P. 
0020.  
 Although 
22 Council Regulation (EC) No 2488/2000 of 10 November 2000 maintaining a freeze of funds 
in relation to Mr Milosevic and those persons associated with him and repealing Regulations 
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these new sanctions were targeted at individuals, the Council took the view that 
Articles 301 and 60 could still be relied upon, on the ground that the individuals in 
question could exercise political influence over the FRY, endangering its democratic 
process.  
 
This legislative practice found judicial endorsement in Kadi23, where the CFI drew a 
distinction between the situation before and after the collapse of the Taliban regime. 
With regard to the former, it held that, in light of considerations of effectiveness and 
humanitarian concerns, Articles 60 and 301 EC should be interpreted as enabling the 
EC institutions to impose sanctions not only against entities or persons who 
physically control part of the territory of a third country and those who effectively 
control its government apparatus but also “against persons and entities associated 
with them and who or which provided them with financial support”.24 Thus, the CFI 
interpreted Articles 60 and 301 EC as empowering the Community to impose 
economic sanctions not only against States and their rulers but also against non-
state actors who are associated with them or directly or indirectly controlled by them. 
This condition was fulfilled when the first wave of sanctions was adopted,25
The situation after the collapse of the Taliban regime, however, was different. The 
contested regulation in Kadi went a step further since the sanctions targeted 
individuals who were neither associated with the incumbent government nor had links 
with a particular territory.
 since at 
that time the Taliban controlled the greater part of Afghan territory.  
 
26 The CFI held that, in those circumstances, there was no 
sufficient link between the targeted individuals and the third country and therefore, 
Articles 301 and 60 EC could not by themselves empower the Community to impose 
sanctions.27 Further, the CFI held that Article 308 could not by itself provide the legal 
basis for the contested regulation since the imposition of economic sanctions against 
terrorists could not be considered to be one of the objectives of the Community.28 
The sanctions in question did not fall within the scope of the common commercial 
policy since the Community’s relations with a third country was not in issue. Nor 
could the regulation be justified in the interests of ensuring undistorted competition in 
the internal market.29
                                                                                                                                                              
(EC) Nos 1294/1999 and 607/2000 and Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 926/98  O J L 287 , 
14/11/2000 P. 0019 – 0037.  
23 Kadi, P. 90. 
24 Ibid, 90. 
25 See above, op.cit. 
26 In fact, the Community has imposed such smart sanctions against individuals a number of 
times within the last decade but they had not been questioned before judicially. All such 
sanctions present the same characteristics as those in Kadi. They originated from UNSC 
resolutions, were adopted at EU level by CFSP measures, and became legally binding by EC 
regulations adopted on the basis of Articles 60, 301 and 308 EC. See for example, Council 
Regulation (EC) No 560/2005, OJ L 95/1 (Côte d'Ivoire). Council Regulation (EC) 
No 1183/2005 OJ L 193/1 -008 (Democratic Republic of the Congo). Council Regulation (EC) 
No 1184/2005  OJ L 193/9 (Darfur region in Sudan) Council Regulation (EC) No 305/2006 OJ 
L 51/1(sanctions against persons suspected of involvement in the assassination of the former 
Primer Minister Rafiq Hariri).  
Notably, economic sanctions have also been imposed on individuals indicted by an 
international judicial tribunal. See Council Regulation (EC) No 1763/2004 of 11 October 2004 
imposing certain restrictive measures in support of effective implementation of the mandate of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) OJ L 315 , 14/10/2004 P. 
0014 – 0023.  
27 Kadi, 93-97. Yusuf, 128-133 Minin, 67-68. 
28 Kadi, op.cit., paras 116-117. 
29 Kadi, op.cit., para 111.  
 The CFI also rejected the argument that the maintenance of 
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international peace and security could be considered as a general objective of the 
Community. It fell rather within the Second Pillar of the Union. Notably, the CFI held 
that Article 308 cannot be used to attain one of the objectives of Treaty of the 
European Union on the ground that its elevation to an inter-pillar basis would run 
counter to the constitutional architecture of the distinct pillars.30
Nevertheless, the CFI held that Article 308 in conjunction with Articles 301 and 60 
gave power to the Council to adopt the contested regulation. First, it pointed out that 
Articles 60 and 301 EC are wholly special provisions in that they enable the Council 
to take action to achieve the objectives not of the Community but of the Union. 
Secondly, under Article 3 TEU, the Union is to be served by a single institutional 
framework and ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole. Just as all 
the powers provided for by the EC Treaty may prove to be insufficient to allow the 
institutions to act in order to attain one of the objectives of the Community, so the 
powers to impose economic sanctions provided for by Articles 60 EC and 301 EC 
may prove to be insufficient to allow the institutions to attain the objective of the 
CFSP. There are therefore good grounds for accepting that, in the specific context 
contemplated by Articles 60 EC and 301 EC, recourse to the additional legal basis of 
Article 308 EC is justified for the sake of the requirement of consistency laid down in 
Article 3 EU.
  
 
31
On appeal, Maduro AG rejected the legitimacy of recourse to Article 308 but opined 
that Articles 60 and 301 EC are by themselves sufficient legal bases. First, he 
employed a textual argument. He pointed out that the only requirement provided for 
in Articles 301 and 60 is that the Community measures adopted thereunder must 
interrupt or reduce economic relations with third countries. The Treaty does not 
regulate what shape the measures should take, who should be the target or who 
should bear their burden.
 
 
32 He reasoned that, by adopting sanctions against entities 
located in third countries, economic relations between the Community and these 
countries are also inevitably affected33. Secondly, he argued that the CFI’s restrictive 
reading of Article 301 deprived it of much of its practical use as it disabled the 
Community from adapting to modern, mutating threats to international peace and 
security.34
The ECJ found the Advocate General’s reasoning unconvincing. It held that the 
contested sanctions could not be adopted solely on the basis of Articles 60 and 301 
EC since they did not bear any link to the governing regime of a third country. The 
essential purpose and object of the contested regulation was to combat international 
terrorism and not to affect economic relations between the Community and the third 
countries where the listed persons were located.
  
 
 35
The ECJ took the view that the contested sanctions could be adopted on the 
combined legal basis of Articles 60, 301 and 308 EC but for reasons different from 
those accepted by the CFI. It found the bridge rationale of the CFI lacking. First, it 
held that, although Articles 60 and 301 establish a bridge between the imposition of 
  
 
                                                        
30 Kadi, 120. Yusuf, 156. 
31 Kadi, op.cit. paras 127-128. 
32 Opinion of Maduro AG, op.cit., para 12. 
33 Op.cit., para 13.  
34 In the words of the Advocate General, the exclusion of non-state actors from economic 
relations with third countries would amount to ignoring “a basic reality of international 
economic life: that the governments of most countries do not function as gatekeepers for the 
economic relations and activities of each specific entity within their borders”. Op.cit. para 13. 
35 Paras 166-169. 
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economic sanctions by the Community and CFSP objectives, such bridge does not 
extend to other provisions of the Treaty. Action under Article 308 can only be 
undertaken in order to attain one of the objectives of the Community which cannot be 
regarded as including the objectives of the CFSP.36 Secondly, the Court took the 
view that recourse to Article 308 would run counter to the inter-pillar nature of the 
Union. The constitutional architecture of the pillars, as intended by the framers of the 
Treaties, militated against any extension of the bridge to articles of the EC Treaty 
other than those which explicitly created a link.37 Finally, employing the rationale of 
Opinion 2/94,38 it held that Article 308 EC, being an integral part of an institutional 
system based on the principle of enumerated competences, cannot serve as a basis 
for widening the scope of Community powers beyond the framework created by the 
Treaty provisions defining its tasks and activities.39
But, in a somewhat surprising face vault the ECJ found that Article 308 was correctly 
included in the legal basis of the contested regulation. It reasoned that, although 
Articles 60 and 301 authorised only sanctions against states, recourse to Article 308 
could be made to extend their limited ambit ratione materiae, provided that the other 
conditions for its applicability were satisfied.
 
40 Inasmuch as they provide for 
Community powers to impose economic sanctions in order to implement CFSP 
action, Articles 60 and 301 are the expression of an implicit and underlying 
Community objective, namely that “of making it possible to adopt such measures 
through the efficient use of a Community instrument”.41
There are, in fact, powerful arguments against Community competence. It may be 
argued that, as a passerelle provision, Article 301 should be interpreted restrictively. 
An unduly broad interpretation would undermine the separation of pillars and the 
distinct methods of integration and legal instruments (or lack thereof) ascribed to the 
Second Pillar. Furthermore, in a legal system which abides by the rule of law, the 
power of public authorities, especially supra-national ones, to impose sanctions on 
individuals should be interpreted narrowly. Granting to the Community a broad power 
to impose such sanctions means, inevitably, less democracy since sanctions can find 
 This, the Court held, was a 
Community objective for the purposes of which the residual clause of Article 308 can 
be utilized. The Court also found that the second condition of Article 308, namely that 
the measure must relate to the operation of the common market, was also fulfilled so 
that it was possible to adopt the contested regulation on the basis of the combined 
basis of Articles 60, 301 and 308 EC. This novel and somewhat esoteric reasoning 
raises a number of objections which will be discussed in the next section. 
 
A Critique: Adapting the Greek Temple to Withstand 21st Century Tremors 
 
The issue of Community competence is highly problematic and Kadi can justly be 
seen as a borderline case. In view of the language of Article 301, establishing 
Community competence requires a leap of faith. If such a leap is to be performed at 
all, it can be performed more persuasively by relying solely on Articles 60 and 301 
rather than invoking Article 308. 
 
                                                        
36 See paras 197-201. 
37 Ibid, para 202. 
38 Para 30. 
39 Ibid, para 203. 
40 para 216. 
41 Para 226. 
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their way to the national statute book directly from the UN Sanctions Committee 
without going through any kind of parliamentary control at national or EU level.42
It is worth outlining in this context the rationale of smart sanctions. In contrast to 
comprehensive sanctions which burden a country as a whole, smart sanctions target 
specific institutions, groups or individuals. They developed and gained increasing 
prominence in the 1990s as the UN sought to explore more effective ways to fulfill its 
function of maintaining international peace and security. In view of their perceived 
advantages, smart sanctions have become the favoured heavy hand of preventive 
diplomacy. By targeting decision-makers and elites, they put coercive pressure on 
specifically designated individuals, thus maximizing their effectiveness whilst 
minimizing unintended negative humanitarian impact on large segments of the 
population.
  
 
The above arguments however are not conclusive. As regards democracy, the 
resulting deficit should be filled by ensuring vigorous judicial control and enhancing 
parliamentary scrutiny rather than by denying competence to the Community, if such 
competence can rest on the Treaty. As regards the nature of Article 301 as a 
passerelle provision, the starting point should be its objectives. The scope of 
measures that can be adopted on its basis can only be properly determined by 
reference to its aims. Article 301 seeks to enable the transition from political 
decisions reached under the auspices of CFSP to concrete legislative measures. Its 
objective is, in fact, to facilitate a transition between the pillars rather than to prevent 
it. As the CFI pointed out, Article 3 TEU mandates that the Union is to be served by a 
single institutional framework and stresses specifically the need to “ensure the 
consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, 
security, economic and development policy”. There is nothing to prevent the judiciary 
to interpret the EC Treaty in the light of the Treaty on European Union. Such 
interpretation to ensure consistency is in fact dictated by the unity of purpose which 
underlies the founding Treaties and accords with the duty of sincere cooperation 
provided for in Article 10 EC.  
 
43 Irrespective of their possible drawbacks as instruments of foreign 
policy,44
                                                        
42 Under Articles 301 and 60 EC, economic sanctions are adopted by the Council on a 
proposal from the Commission without any involvement on the part of the European 
Parliament. Article 308 provides for the consultation of the Parliament but this is a benign 
input since the Council is not required to follow Parliament’s opinion. By virtue of Article 249 
EC, the contested regulation became part of the law of the land in each of the Member States 
from the time of its entry into force without the need for any implementing measures. Indeed, 
English courts have refused to question its validity in the light of the CFI’s ruling in Kadi: see 
M v HM Treasury [2006] EWCH 2328. 
 it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the general population of the 
targeted country is much more likely to suffer less by the imposition of targeted 
sanctions than by the imposition of general ones. From the humanitarian point of 
view, and also from the point of view of adverse legal repercussions, it would be odd 
if it was accepted that Articles 301 and 60 EC enable the Community to do more, i.e. 
43 See, for a detailed discussion, Swiss Federal Office for Foreign Economic Affairs, Expert 
Seminar on Targeting  UN Financial Sanctions, 17-19 March 1998, Interlaken, and, esp. 
Second Interlaken Seminar, 29-31 March 1999, p. 5. For the implementation of such 
sanctions, see Targeted Financial Sanctions, A Manual for Design and Implementation, 
published by the Swiss Confederation in association with the UN Secretariat and the Watson 
Institute for International Studies, Brown University, 2001. All documents available at 
<http://www.seco.admin.ch/themen/00513/00620/00639/index.html?lang=en>. 
44 For a detailed analysis, see House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs, The 
Impact of Economic Sanctions, 2nd Report of Session 2006–07, HMSO, 9 May 2007; cf 
Drezner, D.W. (2003) “How Smart are Smart Sanctions?” International Studies Review, Vol. 
5, No. 1, pp. 107. 
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impose comprehensive sanctions against countries which burden the whole of the 
population, but not less, i.e. adopt targeted sanctions against specific groups. It may 
be retorted that this is the language of political expediency rather than the language 
of law. Still, insofar as the purpose of Article 301 as a passerelle is to provide means 
to achieve objectives, the rationale of smart sanctions adds credence to a purposive 
and evolutive interpretation of that provision.   
 
As the CFI accepted, Article 301 was designed to enable the Community to comply 
with international commitments of the Member States, especially those undertaken 
under the auspices of the UN.45 It is correct, as the ECJ pointed out, that an exact 
correlation between Article 41 of the UN Charter which authorises the Security 
Council to adopt economic sanctions and Article 301 cannot be drawn. The fact, 
however, that Article 301 refers only to the imposition of economic sanctions on third 
countries does not mean that the authors of the Treaty purposefully excluded 
sanctions against non State organisations. At the time when that provision was 
introduced by the Treaty on European Union, smart sanctions simply did not exist as 
instruments of foreign policy.46
If applied consistently, a narrow interpretation of Article 301 EC would appear to lead 
to odd practical results. It would be possible for the Community to impose sanctions 
on non-state entities who finance a rogue regime or a rebel group which exercises de 
facto control over part of the territory of a country but, as soon as the rogue regime 
falls or the rebel group is defeated, the Community would no longer be able to renew 
the sanctions even if the targets continued to pose a substantial and imminent threat 
to the political stability of the country in question. This would hardly by compatible 
with the need to maintain international peace and stability which is one of the key 
objectives of the CFSP and the underlying aim of Article 301 EC.
  
 
47
There are, in summary, four arguments in favour of Community competence First, as 
the Advocate General opined, the language of Article 301 does not exclude the 
imposition of sanctions against individuals. Secondly, a historical interpretation of the 
provision suggests that the authors of the Treaty had no intention to exclude such 
sanctions. Thirdly, a teleological and evolutionary interpretation favour competence 
 In short, a narrow 
interpretation of Article 301 would be based on a formalistic distinction between State 
and private action which would not do justice to the forces that shape the sources 
and exercise of political power. 
 
                                                        
45 See Kadi, op.cit., para 202. 
46 Article 41 authorises the UNSC to take measures which “may include complete or partial 
interruption of economic relations”. Article 301, by contrast, refers to “action by the 
Community to interrupt or to reduce in part or completely economic relations with one or more 
third countries” (emphasis added). This difference in terminology however is by no means 
conclusive. Prior to the introduction of Article 301 by the TEU, economic sanctions against 
third countries were imposed on the basis of Article 133 EC on the common commercial 
policy. That provision was designed to serve trade policy objectives and its use for the 
adoption of sanctions pursuing foreign policy objectives was controversial. With the insertion 
of Article 301 EC, the drafters of the TEU sought to avoid discrepancies between CFSP 
objectives and the implementing powers of the Community. Article 301 did not refer to non-
state actors since at the time of its introduction smart sanctions were not used as an 
instrument of foreign policy. See G Zagel, Sanctions of the European Community: A 
Commentary on Art. 301 TEC. Law of the European Union, Forthcoming Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=862024 and Koutrakos, op.cit., at 423-4.  
47 A further argument in support of the view that Articles 301 and 60 EC are sufficient legal 
basis is that these provisions refer to “third countries”, as opposed to “third states”. The term 
“countries” is wider than “states” and appears to encompass the population rather than solely 
the government or the concept of public power in the sense of etat.  
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to impose sanctions against non-State actors. Finally, such interpretation appears 
suited to the nature of Article 301 as a passerelle provision which provides a bridge 
between the first and the second pillar.  
 
Thus, if it is to be accepted that the Community has competence, it is submitted that 
the appropriate basis should be found in Articles 310 and 60 and that recourse to 
Article 308 EC is superfluous. As Maduro AG noted, Article 308 cannot serve as an 
inter-pillar bridge. It is strictly an enabling provision which provides the means but not 
the objective.48
The Court appears to draw a distinction between the ultimate objectives pursued by 
the underlying CFSP common position, which was to maintain international peace 
and security, and a separate, instrumental, objective of the contested regulation, 
namely to prevent certain persons associated with terrorism from having at their 
disposal economic resources.
 Either, a measure targeting non-state actors comes within the 
objectives of the CFSP, in which case it can be adopted under Article 301 EC, or it 
does not, in which case Article 308 cannot be used as its basis. Increasing the 
quantity of legal bases cannot improve their quality.  
 
At this juncture, it is worth looking closer at the reasoning of the ECJ. The Court held 
that Article 308 could be used because the conditions for its application were fulfilled. 
These are that action must be necessary to achieve Community objectives and that 
such action must relate to the operation of the common market. It is however difficult 
to see how these prerequisites are fulfilled.  
 
49 Whilst Article 308 could not be utilized to fulfil directly 
the first, it could be utilized to fulfil the second. The Community objective pursued, in 
fulfilment of which Article 308 could be resorted to, was not to combat terrorism but to 
make it possible to adopt the measures envisaged by Article 60 and 301 “through the 
efficient use of a Community instrument”.50 This distinction however appears to put 
the cart before the horses: If Articles 60 and 301 only authorize the imposition of 
sanctions against states, as the Court proclaimed that the do, how can it be said that 
their objectives include the imposition of sanctions against individuals? In effect, the 
Court’s reasoning confuses means with objectives.51
                                                        
48 Op.cit., para 15 of the Opinion. 
49 An argument to this effect was submitted by the Government of the United Kingdom: see 
Kadi, op.cit. para 221.  
50 Op.cit., para 226. 
51  The ECJ derived support from Article 60(2) but it is hard to see how this provision can 
come into play. Article 60(2) enables a Member State to take unilateral measures against a 
third country with regard to capital movements and payments. Such measures may be taken, 
for serious political reasons and on grounds of urgency, in the absence of Community 
economic sanctions adopted under Article 60(1). It is not easy to see how Article 60(2) can 
have a bearing on the competence of the Community under Article 60(1). It is conditioned by 
the same requirement, namely that the measures must be ‘against third countries” as 
opposed to non-state actors. The Court’s reasoning appears to contradict its earlier findings 
that Article 308 cannot be utilized to fulfil Union as opposed to Community objectives. 
 It appears to accept that there 
is a Community objective to facilitate the imposition of economic sanctions through 
Community measures in order to implement CFSP goals which exists beyond and 
above the wording of Articles 301 and 60.  If that is the case, it means that those 
provisions have a purely subordinate role similar to that of Article 308 and, if so, their 
scope should not be extended by recourse to another means clause such as Article 
308. The Court’s conclusion in fact undermines its earlier finding that Article 308 
cannot be used to pursue CFSP objectives. 
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The rationale underlying the second condition for the application of Article 308, 
namely that the measure must relate to the operation of the common market, 
appears equally flawed. The Court held that, if economic sanctions were imposed 
unilaterally by each Member State, the multiplication of national measures might 
affect the operation of the common market. Such measures could affect interstate 
trade, especially the movement of capital and payments and the right of 
establishment. In addition, they could create distortions of competition, since any 
differences between state sanctions could operate to the advantage or disadvantage 
of the competitive position of certain economic operators.52
This reasoning does not appear persuasive for the following reasons. The purpose of 
the sanctions is clearly not to regulate the common market but to combat terrorism. 
Any effects that they may have on free movement are incidental. In defining the 
scope of harmonisation action under Article 95 EC, the ECJ has held that there must 
be a need to eliminate substantial or “appreciable” distortions in competition.
 
 
53 In the 
present case, there is scant evidence that such distortions might arise in the absence 
of Community legislation and, in any event, the Court did not attempt to engage in 
any inquiry to determine the threshold of appreciability. Similarly, under established 
case law, a mere risk of disparities between national rules and a theoretical risk of 
obstacles to free movement or distortions of competition is not sufficient to justify the 
use of Article 95.54 The Community has competence to adopt a harmonization 
measure only if it designed to prevent, and capable of preventing, actual or 
foreseeable obstacles to trade or distortions in competition. Although recourse to 
Article 95 EC is possible if the aim is to prevent the emergence of future obstacles to 
trade resulting from multifarious development of national laws, the emergence of 
such obstacles must be likely and the measure in question must be designed to 
prevent them.55 It does not appear that the contested regulation in Kadi fulfils this 
test. As the CFI pointed out, the implementation of the UNSC resolutions by the 
Member States would not pose a serious danger of discrepancies in the application 
of sanctions. For one thing, the UNSC resolutions contained clear, precise and 
detailed definitions and obligations that left scarcely any room for interpretation. For 
another, the importance of the sanctions was so great that there was no reasonable 
danger of inconsistent application at the national level.56
The final argument used by the Court also raises objections. The Court held that 
adding Article 308 to the legal basis of the contested regulation enables the 
European Parliament to take part in the decision-making process whereas Articles 60 
and 301 provide for no such role for the Parliament. This argument echoes of 
Titanium Dioxide and recognises the democratic deficit in the imposition of sanctions. 
 Taken at face value, the 
Court’s rationale in Kadi suggests that the threshold which triggers the application of 
Article 308, a residual provision, is much lower than the threshold which triggers 
Article 95, the main internal market tool of the Treaty. This is however hardly what 
the Court must have intended.  A clarification of the law in this context is now 
urgently needed. 
                                                        
52 Para 230. 
53 C-376/98 Germany v Parliament and Council (Tobacco I case) [2000] ECR I-8419, para 
106. 
54 Case C-380/03 Germany v Parliament and Council, (Tobacco II case), judgment of  12 
December 2006, para 37; Joined cases C-154/04 and C-155/04 The Queen, Alliance for 
Natural Health Nutri-Link Ltd v Secretary of State for Health [2005] ECR I-6451 (Vitamins 
case), para 28. 
55 see e.g. Tobacco II case, op.cit., paras 39 & 41; Case C-377/98 Netherlands v Parliament 
and Council [2001] ECR I-7079, para 15; Vitamins case, op.cit., para 29. 
56 See Kadi, op.cit., para 113. 
 13 
It is however not capable of triggering the application of Article 308 or any other legal 
basis where its substantive conditions are not fulfilled.57
All in all, the ECJ’s reasoning on competence does not appear convincing. Similarly, 
the distinction drawn by the CFI between sanctions against the de jure or de facto 
rulers of a country, which can be imposed solely on the basis of Articles 301 and 60, 
and sanctions which have no link with the rulers or the territory of a third country, 
which can only be imposed with the aid of Article 308, appears somewhat artificial 
and fraught with practical difficulties. In its judgment in Minin, which was delivered by 
the CFI after its judgment in Kadi but before the ECJ’s decision, the CFI itself 
endorsed sanctions based solely on Articles 301 and 60 EC against Charles Taylor, 
the former Liberian President, members of his family and senior officials of his former 
regime, to avoid them from interfering in the restoration of peace and stability in 
Liberia although they no longer controlled its government or any territory. In Minin the 
CFI relied on the correct criterion, namely, the scope and objectives of the UNSC 
which the Community sanctions sought to implement.
  
58
Notably, in Ayadi, a case decided by the CFI after its judgment in Kadi but before the 
ECJ’s decision in that case, the CFI found that the principle of subsidiarity cannot be 
used as an autonomous ground of review in the sphere of Articles 301 and 60 EC. 
The applicant had contended that the Member States were better placed to 
determine which measures were necessary to implement the UNSC resolutions and 
that, by compromising their freedom of choice, the contested regulation failed to 
abide with subsidiarity. The CFI held that, even if it were assumed that economic 
sanctions did not fall within the exclusive competence of the Community, there was 
no room for subsidiarity. Articles 60 and 301 enable the Community to act only where 
such action is deemed to be necessary to attain CFSP objectives. Thus, in relation to 
the economic sanctions, the Treaty confers on the Union the power to determine 
whether action by the Community is necessary and such determination falls within 
the discretion of the Union. But even if subsidiarity was applicable, the uniform 
implementation of the UNSC resolutions could be better achieved by Community 
action rather than by action on the part of each Member State.
 A sufficient link with the 
territory of a country exists where the targeted individuals can be said to be a threat 
to international peace and security by seeking to undermine stability in the region.  
Two further points may be made in relation to competence.  
 
59
Finally, it will be noted that the discussion about competence would be otiose if the 
Lisbon Treaty came into force. Article 215(2) on the Functioning of the European 
Union expressly grants the Council power to adopt restrictive measures against 
individuals, groups and non-state groups on the basis of a CFSP decision.
.  
 
60
The status of UNSC Resolutions under EC law 
  
  
 
Once it is established that the Community has competence to adopt the contested 
sanctions, the next issue to consider is the effect of UNSC resolutions in the 
                                                        
57 Cf Case C-155/91 Commission v Council (Waste Disposal Directive case) [1993] ECR I-
939 where the ECJ distinguished Titanium Dioxide and placed limits on the argument of 
democracy. 
58 See Minin, op.cit., para 68-74. 
59 Ibid, 108-114. See also Minin, op.cit., paras 76 and 89. 
60 Article 215(2) is the successor of Article III-322(2) of the Constitutional Treaty. Notably, 
although the Lisbon Treaty excludes the jurisdiction of the ECJ from CFSP issues, it provides 
for an exception in relation to sanctions imposed under Article 215(2) which can be 
challenged by way of direct action. See Article 24(1) TEU and Article 275(2) TFEU as 
provided by the Lisbon Treaty.  
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Community legal order. It is clear that, as a matter of international law, the UN 
Charter takes precedence over the domestic law of its Member States and such 
primacy extends to UNSC resolutions.61 But where does Community law fit in the 
international law universe? The CFI held that the Community is not bound by the UN 
Charter by virtue of public international law, since it is not a member of the UN or an 
addressee of the resolutions of the Security Council, but is bound by virtue of the EC 
Treaty itself.62
Referring to International Fruit,
 It based the primacy of the UN Charter on the combined effects of 
Articles 307(1) and 297 EC and the theory of substitution. Article 307(1), which was 
central to the CFI’s reasoning, seeks to preserve the binding effect of international 
agreements concluded by Member States before they assumed obligations under the 
EC Treaties. The CFI pointed out that, at the time when they concluded the EC 
Treaty, the Member States were bound by their obligations under the UN Charter.   
 
63 it held that, by concluding the EC Treaty between 
them, the Member States could not transfer to the Community more powers than 
they possessed or withdraw from their obligations to third countries under the UN. It 
followed that the Community must respect Member States’ obligations under the 
Charter. The CFI derived further support for primacy from the theory of substitution. 
This theory, first developed in International Fruit,64 posits that, where under the EC 
Treaties the Community assumes powers previously exercised by the Member 
States in an area governed by an international agreement, the provisions of that 
agreement become binding on the Community. Thus, in so far the powers necessary 
for the performance of the Member States’ obligations under the UN Charter have 
been transferred to the Community, there are knock-on effects for both the Member 
States and the Community. On the one hand, the Member States undertake, 
pursuant to public international law, to ensure that the Community itself should 
exercise those powers in accordance with the UN Charter. On the other hand, by 
assuming powers previously exercised by Member States in the area governed by 
the UN Charter, the Community becomes bound by its provisions.65 The primacy of 
the Charter was further reiterated by Article 297 EC which was specifically introduced 
in the Treaty for that purpose.66
Having established that the Community was bound by the UN Charter, the CFI 
reached the conclusion that it was barred from reviewing the validity of the contested 
 
 
                                                        
61 The primacy of the Charter over the domestic law of the States derives from customary 
international law as consolidated in Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties of 23 May 1969 which states that a contracting party may not invoke the provisions 
of its domestic law as a justification for its failure to perform a treaty. The primacy of the 
Charter over other international agreements is expressly laid down in Article 103 of the 
Charter and extends even to posterior agreements: see Article 30 of the Vienna Convention 
and the judgment of ICJ in Nicaragua v United States, ICJ Reports 1984,  p. 392, para 107. 
Kadi, op.cit., paras 182-184. 
62 Kadi, paras 192, 203-204. Yusuf, 242-257. 
63 Kadi, op.cit., para 188. Joined Cases 21-24/72 International Fruit Company NV and others 
v Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit [1972] ECR 1219.  
64 Op.cit. 
65 Kadi, op.cit., paras 198-203. As the President of the CFI put it, the Community became the 
“de facto successor to the obligations of the Member States under Art. 25 of the UN Charter”. 
See Case T-306/01 R, Yusuf v Council, Order of the President of the Court of First Instance 
of 7 May 2002, [2002] ECR II-02387, para. 87.  
66 Kadi, op.cit., para 188. Article 297 requires Member States to consult each other with a 
view to taking together the steps needed to prevent the functioning of the common market 
being affected by measures which a Member State may be called upon to take “in order to 
carry out obligations it has accepted for the purpose of maintaining peace and international 
security”. 
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regulation on the basis of Community law. Since the regulation implemented a UNSC 
resolution, review of the former would inevitably carry with it incidental review of the 
latter, which would be incompatible with the primacy of the Charter. The CFI 
accepted however that UNSC resolutions must observe the fundamental peremptory 
provisions of jus cogens and proceeded to examine whether the contested sanctions 
complied with them.   
 
By this construct, the CFI sought to reach a golden balance. It affirmed the primacy 
of the UN Charter over Community law whilst subjecting the Security Council to 
principles endogenous to the legal system at the apex of which it stands. This 
reasoning however is neither logically inevitable nor constitutionally secure. The CFI 
clearly took an internationalist approach rather than a constitutionalist one. Not only 
did it view UN and Community law in a strong hierarchical relationship but accorded 
to UN primacy its fullest weight allowing it to perforate the constitutional boundaries 
of the Community legal order. The opposite view, endorsed by the ECJ and Maduro 
AG, is preferable. The primacy of the Charter operates in the field of international 
law. The effect of international obligations within the Community legal order must be 
determined by reference to conditions set by Community law, and no provision of the 
Treaty abrogates the application of fundamental rights.  
 
It is worth examining at this juncture the relationship between EC and international 
law in more detail. None of the arguments used by the CFI suggest that the UNSC 
resolutions may take unqualified precedence over fundamental rights as protected by 
Community law. Articles 307(1) and 297 are exceptional provisions of the Treaty 
which, under certain conditions, authorise deviant conduct on the part of the Member 
States to serve international law commitments. They do not impose on the 
Community an obligation to suspend the application of fundamental constitutional 
principles. The CFI’s reading of Article 307 appears selective. Article 307(2) 
expressly states that, to the extent that pre-existing international agreements 
concluded by one or more Member States are incompatible with Community law, the 
Member States in question “shall take all appropriate steps to eliminate the 
incompatibilities established”. This imposes a best efforts obligation which has 
received an interpretation favourable to the Community. The case law under Article 
307(2) seeks to minimize breaches to the integrity of the Community legal order 
caused by pre-existing international obligations rather than to give a carte blanche to 
the Member States to depart from fundamental constitutional principles.67
                                                        
67 Thus, as interpreted by the ECJ, Article 307 EC requires the Member State to take specific 
steps and exhaust all avenues available in order to eliminate all incompatibilities with 
Community law arising from the international agreement in question: see e.g Case C-62/98 
Commission v Portugal [2000] ECR I-5171. The ECJ has interpreted article 307 EC as “a duty 
on the part of the institutions of the Community not to impede the performance of the 
obligations of the Member States which stem from a prior agreement”: C-812/79, Attoney-
General v Burgoa, [1980] ECR 2787, para. 9. Nevertheless, it does not entail a duty of active 
cooperation upon the Community and the latter is not required to take into account 
agreements between its Member States and third parties when acting within its competences: 
see the Opinion of Advocate General Capotorti in Attoney-General v Burgoa, op.cit. at para of 
the Opinion. 2. Whilst Article 307 EC allows Member States to honour obligations owed to 
non-member States under international agreements preceding the Treaty, it does not 
authorise them to exercise rights under such agreements in intra-Community relations (see, in 
particular, Commission v Luxembourg, cited above, para 40, and Case C-203/03 Commission 
v Austria [2005] ECR I-935, paras 57 to 59). For an even further reaching understanding of 
the obligations imposed on Member States by Article 307(2) EC, see the Opinion of Maduro 
AG of 10 July 2008 in Cases C-205 and C-249/06 Commission v Austria and Sweden, n.y.r. 
 It is simply 
not convincing to argue that all tasks that the Member States, or the Community in 
their lieu, are called upon to take at any time in the future as a result of UNSC 
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resolutions are simpliciter exempted from the fundamental guarantees of Community 
law. 
 
More importantly, Article 307 may not take precedence over fundamental rights, the 
protection of which the ECJ ensures in fulfilling its function under Article 220 of the 
Treaty. As the ECJ and Maduro AG stated on appeal, Article 307 may not grant 
UNSC resolutions with a “supra-constitutional” status and render Community 
measures implementing UN law immune from judicial review68. In the light of article 
6(1) EU, under no circumstance may the Community depart from its founding 
principles, in particular, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The 
case-law of the ECJ also demonstrates its serious commitment to the rule of law 
under which measures in breach of human rights are excluded from the Community 
legal order.69 Thus, neither Article 297 nor Article 307 may permit any derogations 
from the principles laid down in Article 6(1) TEU which form part of the very 
foundations of the Community legal order.70
An important case in this context is Bosphorus,
 
 
71 which arose from the sanctions 
imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Irish authorities had impounded 
an aircraft which Bosphorus Airways, a Turkish company, had leased from the 
Yugoslav national airline on the basis of a Council regulation which, in 
implementation of a UNSC resolution, required Member States to impound 
Yugoslavian assets. The Court dismissed the argument of Bosphorus that its right to 
property and its freedom to pursue a commercial activity had been infringed. The 
judgment makes clear that Community regulations must be interpreted in the light of 
UNSC resolutions which they seek to implement, and that the importance of UN 
objectives may justify substantial limitations on fundamental rights.72
                                                        
68 Kadi, op.cit., para 304 of the ECJ’s judgment and see per Maduro AG at para. 25 of his 
Opinion. For instance, in the United States, though the UN Charter is considered the 
“supreme law of the land” by virtue of Article VI of the US Constitution, it is not the case that 
UNSC resolutions prevail over “posterior” federal law.  In accordance with the “later-in-time” 
principle, Congress may validly adopt statutes contrary to pre-existing UNSC resolutions. 
See, for instance, Diggs v Schultz, 470 F2d. 461 (DC Cir. 1972), where the US Court of 
Appeal for the DC Circuit ruled that the “Byrd Amendment” (a congressional statute), which 
sough to re-establish trade with Rhodesia in violation of a previous UNSC resolution, was 
constitutional. See, more generally. J NAFZIGER & E WISE, The Status in United States Law 
of Security Council Resolutions Under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, (1998) 46 
American Journal of Comparative Law, 421-436. See more generally, A BIANCHI, 
International Law and US Courts: The Myth of Lohengrin Revisited, (2004) European Journal 
of International Law, pp 751-781. 
 It does not 
however establish that the ECJ may not review Community measures which give 
effect to UNSC resolutions. Bosphorus was, in fact, a case where the Court was 
preoccupied with the interpretation of a Council regulation imposing sanctions and 
not its validity, which was not in issue in the proceedings.  
 
69 See e.g. Cases Case 294/83 Les Verts [1986] ECR 1339, Case 222/84 Johnston v RUC 
[1986] ECR 1651, Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659. 
70 ECJ Kadi, op.cit. paras 303-304. 
71 Case C-84/95 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v Minister for Transport and 
the Attorney General [1996] ECR-3935. 
72 In subsequent proceedings, the judgment of the ECJ was confirmed by the ECtHR. 
Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland (45036/98) (2006) 42 
EHRR 1. 
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In Kadi the ECJ asserted the “constitutional hegemony” of the EU,73 reiterating that 
that an international agreement cannot affect the allocation of powers fixed by the 
Treaties and consequently the autonomy of the Community legal order.74 The 
judgment is less accommodating to the primacy of the UN than it might have been 
expected. Whilst it accepted that special importance must be attached to UNSC 
resolutions, it doubted that immunity for judicial review was an attribute of such 
resolutions as a matter of international law75
The ECJ held that, even if obligations arising from UNSC resolutions were to be 
classified in the internal hierarchy of Community law norms, under Article 300(7) EC 
they would take precedence over secondary Community law but not over the Treaty 
itself and other sources of primary law such as the protection of fundamental rights.
 and placed emphasis on the need to 
accommodate the implementation of UNSC resolutions to the ECJ legal order rather 
than the converse, which lay at the heart of the CFI’s reasoning. 
 
76
It is pertinent to examine here the attitude of the ECtHR towards the UN Charter. The 
Strasbourg Court recently had the opportunity to explore the relationship between the 
Convention and international law in Behrami and Saramati
  
 
Lessons from Strasbourg 
 
77 which arose from the 
Kosovo conflict of 1998 - 1999. The Behramis complained of death and injury caused 
to two children by the explosion of undetonated cluster bombs which had been 
dropped by NATO. At that time, the supervision of de-mining fell within the mandate 
of UNMIK.78
Two issues arose in the case: First, in what circumstances may action by organs of a 
State be attributed to the United Nations rather than to the State itself? Secondly, 
where action is so attributable, should the ECtHR decline jurisdiction? The first issue 
is answered by the Draft Articles of the International Law Commission on the 
responsibility of International Organisations, to which the ECtHR relied. Under Article 
5, where a State organ is placed at the disposal of an international organization, its 
conduct is to be attributed to the latter if the organization “exercises effective control 
over that conduct”. The ECtHR drew a distinction between, on the one hand, 
delegation of UN powers and, on the other hand, authorisation granted by the UN to 
carry out functions which it cannot itself perform. In the circumstances, the Court 
found that, by Resolution 1244 (1999), the UN had delegated its powers to establish 
 Mr Saramati complained of his extra-judicial detention by officers acting 
on the orders of KFOR, the security force established in Kosovo by UNSC Resolution 
1244 (1999). The Behramis’ invoked Article 2 of the Convention and Mr Saramati 
relied on Articles, 5, 6(1) and 13.  
 
                                                        
73 The expression is borrowed from P.J. Spiro, Treaties, International Law, and Constitutional 
Rights, (2000) 55 Stanford Law Review, 1999.  
74 Kadi, para 282. 
75 The ECJ pointed out that the Charter does not impose the choice of a particular model for 
the implementation of UNSC resolutions and leaves the Member States free to decide. It did 
not therefore exclude judicial review of the internal lawfulness of the contested regulation 
under EC law: see paras 298-299. 
76 Kadi, op.cit., para 307-309. 
77 Joined Cases Behrami and Behrami v. France (71412/01), and Saramati v. France, 
Germany and Norway (78166/01) (2007) 45 EHRR SE10. For other cases where the 
Strasbourg Court examines the relationship between the Convention and the UN Charter or 
international more generally, see e.g. Al-Adsani v the United Kingdom (35763/97) (2002) 34 
EHRR 11, Banković and Others v Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States  (52207/99) 
(2007) 44 E.H.R.R. SE 5. 
78 United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo. 
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international security and civil presences to UNMIK and KFOR. Their actions were 
therefore directly attributable to the UN. 
 
The ECtHR then proceeded to examine the implications of this finding for its 
jurisdiction and, more generally the relationship between the Convention and the UN 
acting under Chapter VII of its Charter. In a deferential judgment, it attributed 
particular significance on the imperative nature of maintaining peace and security as 
the principal aim of the UN and the powers accorded to the UNSC under Chapter VII 
to fulfil that aim. In doing so, it appeared to concede that the aim of maintaining 
peace and security and the uniqueness of the UN takes priority or, at least, 
conditions heavily the aims of the ECHR. It held that, since operations established by 
UNSC Resolutions are fundamental to the mission of the UN and rely for their 
effectiveness on support from member states, the Convention cannot be interpreted 
in a manner which would subject acts of the Contracting Parties covered by such 
resolutions and occur prior to or in the course of such missions, to the scrutiny of the 
Court. To do so would be to interfere with the fulfilment of the UN's key mission in 
this field, including the effective conduct of its operations. It would also be tantamount 
to imposing conditions on the implementation of a UNSC Resolution which were not 
provided for in the text of the Resolution itself.79
In response to the applicants’ argument that the substantive and procedural 
protection of fundamental rights provided by KFOR was not equivalent to that under 
the Convention, the ECtHR distinguished Bosphorus
 
 
80
Notably, Behrami was distinguished by the House of Lords in Al Jedda.
 on the ground that the 
circumstances in Bahrami were different. In Bosphorus the seizure of the applicant’s 
leased aircraft had been carried out by the authorities of the respondent State on its 
territory and following a decision by one of its ministers. In Behrami, the acts and 
omissions of KFOR and UNMIK could not be attributed to the respondent states 
since they did not take place on their territory or by virtue of their authorities. 
 
81
In Kadi, the ECJ dismissed the relevance of Behrami on two grounds. First, it held 
that the legal and factual setting of the case was fundamentally different and, 
secondly, it asserted the ideological autonomy of the Community legal order. The 
Convention is designed to operate primarily as an interstate agreement which 
creates obligations between the Contracting Parties at the international level and 
 The 
appellant had been detained by British troops in Iraq and complained that his 
detention infringed his rights under Article 5(1) ECHR. Although he had not been 
charged with any offence, his internment was deemed necessary as he was a 
suspected terrorist. The Secretary of State argued that his detention was attributable 
to the UN but the House of Lords distinguished Behrami on the ground that the 
multinational force in Iraq had been established by the coalition states and not at the 
behest of the UN. Having established that the applicant’s detention was attributable 
to the UK authorities and not to the UN, the House of Lords proceeded to examine 
the relationship between the UN Charter and the Convention. Although Lord 
Bingham acknowledged the “paramount importance” of the Convention, after 
revisiting the objectives and basic tenets of the UN Charter, he resolved the conflict 
in favour of UN primacy. He acknowledged that the ECHR has a special character as 
a human rights instrument but adopted an internationalist perspective holding that 
Article 103 gave precedence to the Charter over any other agreement and left no 
room for any excepted category, save for jus cogens.  
 
                                                        
79 OP.cit., paras 148-149 of the judgment. 
80 Bosphorus, supra. 
81 R (on the application of Al Jedda) v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 58. 
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provides only minimum protection.82 The EC Treaty, by contrast, has founded an 
autonomous legal order, within which States as well as individuals have immediate 
rights and obligations and on the basis of which the ECJ ensures respect for 
fundamental rights as a “constitutional guarantee”. 83
There is no denying that there are important differences between Behrami and Kadi. 
Whilst the former involved actions directly attributable to the UN, in the latter the 
Member States acted as sovereign actors giving effect to UNSC resolutions.
   
 
84
A final argument examined by the ECJ was whether it should abstain from exercising 
review under Community law on the ground that the procedures available under the 
system of sanctions set up by the UN offered adequate protection of fundamental 
rights. It held that the UN procedure, although it had been strengthened since the 
contested sanctions were adopted, could not justify a generalised immunity from its 
jurisdiction. It was in essence diplomatic and intergovernmental rather than judicial in 
nature, lacking basic process rights. The persons concerned did not have the right to 
a hearing or the right to see the evidence. Nor did the Sanctions Committee have an 
obligation to give reasons for refusing removal from the sanctions list.
 The 
ECtHR accepted as much in Behrami, by distinguishing the case from Bosphorus. 
Furthermore, the distinct feature of Kadi is that the UN resolutions in issue were in 
fact not general but concrete and individual in nature, akin to national administrative 
acts, since they specified the persons on whom they applied. This made the 
availability of judicial review all the more imperative.  
 
85
It is indeed widely, albeit not universally, accepted that although the Security Council 
may transgress on treaty or international customary law, it is bound to respect jus 
 
 
Jus Cogens; but what does it mean?  
 
It will be remembered that, according to the CFI, the primacy of the UN Charter 
prevented review of the contested regulations on grounds of fundamental rights as 
protected by Community law but did not preclude review on grounds of compatibility 
with jus cogens. In carrying out such review, the CFI found that the requirements of 
jus cogens were met. The ECJ, by contrast, following  the Opinion of Maduro AG, 
subjected the sanctions to full review under EC fundamental rights standards and 
found them lacking. We will examine in turn the reasoning of the CFI and the ECJ in 
more detail.  
 
The CFI took a rule of law - bound view of international law encouraging the 
constitutionalisation of UNSC action in terms as inoffensive as possible to the 
Security Council. Although it was wrong not to subject the contested measure to full 
review under EC standards, its judgment merits attention for its approach to 
international law. The CFI posited, in effect, two principles: that the UNSC is bound 
by jus cogens and that the rights pleaded by the applicant were part of it.  
 
                                                        
82 The EU Charter expressly views the Convention as providing a minimum threshold, see 
Article 52.3. 
83 Maduro, Op cit, paras 21 and 37; and see the judgment of the ECJ, paras 316-317. 
84 There are also obvious differences between Kadi and Al Jedda. Although in the latter the 
House of Lords accepted that the actions of the British troops was attributable to the UK and 
not to the UN, the factual setting and the legislative framework of the case were 
fundamentally different.  
85 Kadi, op.cit., paras 321-326. 
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cogens.86 A number of considerations support this view. Jus cogens is made up of 
peremptory rules which represent universal values and, as the name suggests, may 
admit no waiver.87 The powers of the UNSC derive from States which are bound by 
international law. In accordance with the principle of “nemo plus juiris ad alium 
transferre protest, quam ispe haberat”, States cannot transfer more powers to the 
UNSC than they themselves have.88 Judicial dicta also point to this direction. 
Notably, in the Bosnia Genocide Convention case, Judge Lauterpacht took the view 
that a resolution which breaches norms of jus cogens is not binding on states.89 
Further, although the Security Council is the most potent global institution,90 it has 
not been vested with unlimited legislative powers and, under Article 24(2) of the 
Charter, in discharging its duties, it is bound to act in compliance with “the purposes 
and principles of the Charter”.91
The CFI was therefore correct to conclude that UNSC resolutions must comply with 
peremptory norms of general international law.
  
 
92
                                                        
86 For a detailed discussion see, A. Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law, 
p.423 et seq., and Erika de Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security 
Council, Hart 2004, at 187 et seq. 
87 See A. Orakhelashvili, op.cit., p 424 where references to further bibliography are given. But 
for the derogability of rules as an attribute of jus cogens see also below. 
88 See Gill, Legal and Some Political Limitations on the Powers of the UN Security Council to 
Exercise its Enforcement Powers under Chapter VII of the Charter, (1995) 26 Netherlands 
Yearbook of International Law 33-138, pp 82; de Wet, op.cit., at 189 et seq. Cf  J. Delbrük 
commentary on Article 24 in Bruno Simma (Ed.), The Charter of the United Nations, A 
Commentary, OUP, 1994, at 404. 
89 ICJ Rep. 1993, 325, 441, para. 102;  95 ILR. 159. See also C SCOTT and Others, 
Memorial for Bosnia: Framework of Legal Arguments Concerning the Lawfulness of the 
Maintenance of United Nations Security Council’s Arm Embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
(1994) 1 Michigan Journal of International Law. 
90 A ORAKHELASHVILI, The Impact of Peremptory Norms on the Interpretation and 
Application of United Nations Security Council Resolutions, (2005) 16:1 European Journal of 
International Law, pp 59-88. 
91 The scope and nature of the limits imposed on its powers are a matter of some debate but, 
at the very least, Article 24(2) means that the SC cannot act “arbitrarily”: see Delbrück, op.cit., 
at p. 448, para 10. For a detailed discussion, see B MARTENCZUK, The Security Council, the 
International Court, and Judicial Review: What Lessons from Lockerbie? (1999) 10 European 
Journal of International Law, pp 517-547. Cf H KELSEN, The law of the United Nations. A 
critical analysis of its Fundamental Problems, (1951), p. 254. For more critical views of the 
powers of the SC as a global legislator, see See P SZASZ, The Security Council Starts 
Legislating, (2002) 96 American Journal of International Law, 901 M HAPPOLD, Security 
Council Resolution 1373 and the Constitution of the United Nations, (2003) 16 Leiden Journal 
of International Law,  J STROMSETH, An Imperial Security Council? Implementing Security 
1373 and 1390, (2003) 97 American Society of International Law Proceedings, 41 -55 and E 
ROSAND, The Security Council as a “Global Legislator”: Ultra Vires or Ultra Innovative, 
(2004) 28 Fordham International Law Journal, 542-590. 
 But what is jus cogens? Article 53 of 
92 The question whether the UNSC Council is bound by jus cogens is distinct from the 
question which judicial bodies might have jurisdiction to apply jus cogens and for what 
purposes. The issue of jurisdiction was not examined separately by the CFI but it can be 
accepted that it was correct to assert such jurisdiction. Given that the application of public 
international law is decentralized and that the ICJ itself has no jurisdiction to review directly 
decisions taken by UN organs, States should be entitled, as a last resort, to review the validity 
of UNSC resolutions under jus cogens. Otherwise, there would be no judicial forum where 
compliance with the peremptory rules of international law could be enforced. In its advisory 
opinion in Certain Expenses (ICJ Rep. 1962, P. 151), the ICJ accepted that States could rely 
on their right of last resort to question the validity of UNSC resolutions subject to two 
limitations. First, UNSC resolutions are presumed to be lawful and, consequently, it is for the 
States to prove that the UNSC measure has breached jus cogens. Secondly, the right of last 
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the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties defines jus cogens as 
peremptory norms of general international law which are accepted and recognized by 
the international community of States as a whole as norms from which no derogation 
is permitted.  In fact, the concept of “jus cogens” is far from clear93
One theory asserts a hierarchy of rights in international law and regards as jus 
cogens human rights from which derogations are not possible under international 
agreements even in times of emergency.
. Although it is 
accepted that human rights fall within its scope, disagreement persists as to the 
precise rights which may be included thereunder. In Kadi, the applicant alleged that 
the contested regulation had breached the right to a fair hearing, the right to property 
and the right to an effective judicial review. Although these rights have long been 
recognised as fundamental in the Community legal order, it is by no means obvious 
that they can be considered as jus cogens.   
94 Such non-derogable rights that must be 
respected by States are contained in Article 4(2) of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)95
                                                                                                                                                              
resort should be restrictively interpreted since otherwise the effectiveness of UNSC 
resolutions would be prejudiced. Although the CFI did not expressly refer to the right of last 
resort, it appears that it endorsed it implicitly. It underlined that reviewing the validity of UNSC 
resolutions was “highly exceptional” (see para 231 of the CFI judgment) and did so not 
directly but collaterally in order to determine the validity of the implementing Community 
legislation. 
 
93 Some authors find the basis of jus cogens on the moral conscience and beliefs of mankind. 
Understood that way, it is linked to postulates of natural law according to which, in 
establishing their contractual relationships, States do not act in absolute freedom but are 
bound by fundamental principles deeply-seated in the international community. Other authors, 
relying on the definition laid down in the Vienna Convention, argue that “jus cogens” needs 
the acceptance and recognition of the international community as a whole. In other words, the 
designation of a norm as part of “jus cogens” needs the active participation of States in the 
law-making process. Article 53 of the Vienna Convention requires the acceptance and 
recognition of the rule by “the international community as a whole”. This expression has been 
interpreted in three different ways, namely, (a) as a condition for unanimity where all States 
must give their acceptance and recognition in the law-making process of jus cogens; (b) as a 
majority rule where a number of States would fashion rules binding upon a dissenting minority 
and (c) as an achievement of a genuine consensus among all essential components of the 
modern international community. Whereas the rule of unanimity seems clearly inoperative, 
the two others represent opposite interests between third-world countries, which would wish 
to see the UN General Assembly into jus cogens law-maker, and powerful countries which 
are reluctant to loose protagonism in the law making process. See further G DANILENKO, 
International jus cogens: Issues of Law-Making, (1991) 2 European Journal of International 
law, pp 42-66.   
94 MERON, On Hierarchy of International Human Rights, (1986) 80 American Journal of 
International Law, 1-24, T KOJI, Emerging Hierarchy in International Human Rights and 
Beyond: From the Perspective of Non-Derogable Rights, (2001) 12:5 European Journal of 
International Law, pp 917-941. 
95 These rights are the right to life, the prohibition of torture or cruel and degrading treatment, 
the prohibition of slavery and servitude or civil imprisonment, the impermissibility of 
retroactive punishment, the right of recognition before the law and freedom of thought, religion 
and conscience. 
. The rationale behind this theory is that, in order 
to respect cultural diversity, a higher threshold for the intervention of the international 
community is required and thus jus cogens is viewed as a minimalist concept. If that 
approach were to be followed, one would conclude that the CFI erred in considering 
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that the rights invoked by the applicant fell within the scope of jus cogens96
It has been suggested however that the fact that a right is derogable does not 
preclude it from being jus cogens. Derogable rights can be considered as jus cogens 
in so far as the conditions laid down by Article 53 of the Vienna Convention are 
fulfilled
 since 
they are not listed in Article 4(2) ICCPR.  
97. This argument seems consistent with the opinion of the UN Human Rights 
Committee (UNHRC) which, despite the wording of the ICCPR, has qualified the right 
to a fair hearing as “non-derogable”98, and also with the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Yugoslavia which in Tadic held that the right to a fair trial was a condition 
sine qua non for the validity of the UNSC resolution creating that Tribunal99
Be this as it may, in Kadi the CFI followed a broad understanding of jus cogens, 
encompassing under it all the rights pleaded by the applicants. In its reasoning, the 
function of jus cogens was not to exclude rights which would otherwise be applicable 
but to lower substantially the degree of judicial scrutiny by pushing well back the 
threshold of review.
. 
Ultimately, therefore, the criterion of non-derogability may not be decisive in 
determining which human rights are to be considered as part of jus cogens.  
100
In relation to the right to property, the CFI pointed out that only an arbitrary 
deprivation of property might be regarded as contrary to jus cogens
 
 
.101 This was not 
the case for a number of reasons. The measure pursued an objective of fundamental 
public interest for the international community; freezing of funds was a temporary 
precautionary measure which did not affect the right to property as such but only the 
use of financial assets; the UNSC resolutions in issue provided for a procedure for 
reviewing the system of sanctions; and  there was also a procedure which enabled 
the persons concerned to present their case to the Sanctions Committee through the 
State of their nationality or residence.102 Furthermore, the CFI placed particular 
emphasis on the fact that the applicable rules provided a derogation from the 
freezing of funds necessary to cover basic expenses (e.g. foodstuffs, rent, and 
medicines) and thus, any degrading or inhuman treatment was avoided103
                                                        
96 P EECKHOUT, Community Terrorism Listings, Fundamental Rights, and UN Security 
Council Resolutions. In Search of the Right Fit. (2007) 3 European Constitutional Law 
Review, pp 183-206. (arguing that the analysis of the CFI on jus cogens is not persuasive). 
97 In accordance with A ORAKHELASHVILI, Peremptory Norms in International Law, (Oxford, 
OUP: 2006), 53-60. When the Vienna Convention alludes to “non-derogation”, it does not 
refer to derogations in case of emergency, but to derogation via concluding an International 
Treaty. Whereas the first type of derogation only limits temporarily a right, the second type 
allows contracting parties to replace public order norms by private autonomy and it is this kind 
of derogation that jus cogens does not allow. 
98 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 29, States of Emergency (article 4), U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001).  
99 Prosecutor v Tadic, (Appeals Chamber), Judgment of the ICTY of the 15 July 1999, Para. 
41-47. 
.  
100 For a criticism of the CFI’s light touch review, see Eeckout, supra note 96, 196. 
101 Kadi, 241. Yusuf, 293. 
102 Kadi, 247-249. Yusuf, 298-302. Ayadi, 135-136. Hassan, 105-109. 
103 Kadi, 241. Yusuf. 291 and 312. This aspect was further developed in Ayadi, 119-133, and 
Hassan, 69-102, where the Court rejected that the exemptions and derogations from the 
freezing of the funds were ineffective. First, though the applicant was deprived from leading a 
normal life, these negative consequences were justified in the light of the objective pursued, 
that is, to combat by all means international terrorism. Secondly, the applicant was not 
prevented from leading a satisfactory life, because it could still purchase everyday consumer 
goods. Thirdly, the contested regulation did not deprive the applicant from carrying on a 
business or trade activity. It only limited the free receipt of the income from such an activity. 
Finally, the Court indicated that Member States refusing to issue an administrative license 
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In relation to the right to be heard, the CFI drew a distinction between the right to a 
hearing before the Council and before the Sanctions Committee. Before the former, it 
held that such right was not applicable since the Council did not enjoy any discretion 
in implementing UNSC resolutions104. As regards the procedure before the Sanctions 
Committee, the CFI did acknowledge that any opportunity for the applicant to present 
his views on the evidence adduced against him was excluded. Nonetheless, the CFI 
took the view that this was an acceptable restriction given that what was at stake was 
a temporary precautionary measure restricting the availability of the applicant’s 
property.105
Finally, in relation to the right of judicial review, the CFI held that it was not within the 
judicial province to verify the existence of a threat to international peace and security 
or to determine the appropriateness of the measures for confronting or settling such 
a threat. It acknowledged that there was no judicial remedy available to the applicant 
since the Security Council had not established an independent international court 
responsible for ruling in actions brought against decisions of the Sanctions 
Committee. It accepted however that the resulting lacuna was not in itself contrary to 
jus cogens. It pointed out that the right of access to the courts, which is recognised 
by Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 14 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is not absolute. It identified, in 
particular, two types of limitation. First, derogations may be introduced at a time of 
public emergency which threatens the life of the nation. Secondly, even when such 
exceptional circumstances do not obtain, there are “inherent restrictions” to the right 
such as the limitations generally recognised by the community of nations to fall within 
the doctrine of State immunity. The CFI held that the immunity from jurisdiction which 
resolutions of the Security Council enjoy as a rule in the domestic legal order of the 
member states of the United Nations is an inherent limitation to the applicant’s right 
of access to a court. This limitation is justified both by the nature of the decisions that 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
necessary to carry out a self-employed activity (taxi-driving license) without taking into 
account the applicant’s needs and without consulting with the Sanctions Comittee, would be a 
misinterpretation or misapplication of the contested regulation. 
104 Kadi, 257-258. Yusuf, 327-328. 
105  Kadi, op.cit., 273-274. In Hassan, in support of his arguments, the applicant relied on two 
cases decided by the US Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia decided few months 
before 9-11. In National Council Resistance of Iran (NCRI) v Department of State, 251 F.3d 
192 (D.C. Cir. 2001), the US Court of Appeal ruled that, in failing to demonstrate that a pre-
designation notice and hearings would put at stake the security of the United States or other 
foreign policy goals, the Secretary of State had violated due process. Contrary to the 
applicant’s submissions in Hassan, however, it is not clear whether this judgment remains 
valid authority post 9-11. In fact, different Federal Circuits have issued contradictory rulings as 
to whether organizations designed as “Global Terrorists” under Executive Order 13,224 
should be entitled to pre-designation. For instance, in Holy Land Foundation for Relief and 
Development v Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156 (DC Cir. 2003), it was held that pre-designation and 
hearing requirements as recognized in the NCRI case were required. Conversely, in Global 
Relief Foundation v O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002), it was held that, in times of 
emergency, the applicant was not constitutionally entitled to pre-designation and post-
designation and hearings were deemed sufficient. For an overview of these cases, see E 
BROXMEYER, The Problems of Security and Freedom: Procedural Due Process and The 
Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act, (2004) 22 Berkeley Journal of International Law, pp 439-488 (supporting a post-
designation yet direct and written notice, but rejecting disclosure of classified information). In 
any case, the CFI categorically stated that rulings of American Courts “have no bearing on the 
circumstances of the case” as they did not concern sanctions imposed by the UNSC, Hassan, 
op.cit., para 94.  
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the Security Council takes under Chapter IV of the UN Charter and by the legitimate 
objective pursued. 106
Ultimately, the CFI’s judgment was that “the applicant’s interest in having a court 
hear his case on its merits is not enough to outweigh the essential public interest in 
the maintenance of international peace and security in the face of a threat clearly 
identified by the Security Council in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations”. The CFI saw the judicialisation of diplomatic protection as a way of 
compensating for the lack of sufficient remedies at international level
 
 
107 and turned to 
national courts to fill the lacuna of judicial protection left by its deference to the 
UNSC. In Kadi it pointed out that it is open to the persons concerned to bring an 
action for judicial review based on domestic law against any wrongful refusal by the 
national authorities to submit their case to the Sanctions Committee for 
reconsideration.108 Subsequently, in Ayadi and Hassan, which were decided before 
the ECJ’s judgment in Kadi, it raised the standard by holding that the UNSC 
resolutions did not oppose to obligations stemming from general principles of EU law, 
pursuant to which the Member States must “ensure, so far as possible, that the 
interested persons are put in a position to put their point of view before the 
competent national authorities where they present a request for their case to be 
reviewed”109. Thus, rediscovering the spirit of Jégo-Quéré,110 the CFI required 
Member States to provide for judicial review of a refusal by national authorities to 
take action with a view to guaranteeing the diplomatic protection of their nationals111
Save for review on grounds of jus cogens, the CFI was reluctant to interfere with the 
decision-making powers of the Security Council. It thus refused to review whether 
there was a threat to the international peace and security holding that it would be 
impossible to carry out such a review without trespassing on the Security Council’s 
prerogatives under Chapter VII in relation to determining, first, whether there exists a 
threat to international peace and security and, second, the appropriate measures for 
confronting or settling such a threat.
. 
It held that prompt state action before the Sanctions Committed is required, unless 
the State concerned puts forward sufficient reasons justifying its refusal to act, which 
are then submitted to the scrutiny of the judiciary.  
 
This “judicialisation” of diplomatic protection falls well short of the requirements of the 
right to judicial protection as understood in Community law proper.  The CFI’s 
reasoning is, in effect, unconvincing because it creates a huge crater in the right to 
judicial protection. 
 
112
                                                        
106 Kadi, paras 287-290. 
107 A VERMEER-KUNZLI, Restricting Discretion: Judicial Review of Diplomatic Protection, 
(2006) 75 Nordic Journal of Internatioinal law, 279-307, holding that recent developments in 
national judiciaries have restricted the degree of discretion enjoyed by the States when 
refusing to exercise diplomatic protection. See for e.g. Abbasi & Anor v Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Common Wealth Affairs, [2002] EWCA Civ 1598, [2002] All ER (d) 70 (Nov) (CA, 
Civ Div). 
108 Kadi, op.cit., para 270. 
109 Ayadi, 147 Hassan, 117. 
110 C-263/02 P Commission v Jégo-Quéré [2004] ECR I-3425, In that case the ECJ called 
upon Member States to fill the gap left by its restrictive interpretation of the conditions that 
must be fulfilled under Article 230(4) EC in order for individuals to have locus standi to seek 
judicial review of Community acts directly before the Community courts. 
111 Ayadi, 152 Hassan, 121. 
112 Kadi, 284. 
. Thus, deference to the UNSC is twofold. The 
CFI renounced power to adjudicate on whether reliance on Chapter VII was 
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appropriate and also on whether targeted sanctions were appropriate means to 
counter terrorism. Thus, the CFI denied the application of the proportionality principle 
to assess the validity of the UNSC resolutions113. Subsequently, however, in Ayadi it 
affirmed that judicial recourse to proportionality implicitly takes place when balancing 
the protection of fundamental rights vis-à-vis the objectives that the Community 
legislation, and by extension the parent UNSC resolution, sought to attain114. The 
CFI’s reluctance to question the Security Council’s discretion reflects the traditional 
approach to the interpretation of Article 39 of the Charter under which it is for the 
Security Council alone to determine the existence of a threat to the peace and 
security of the international community. In other words, article 39 UN Charter gives 
full discretion to the UNSC. It is a political decision which falls outside the scope of 
judicial review.115
By contrast, in Kadi Maduro AG refused to follow the political question doctrine and 
appeared reluctant to concede that the Court may carry out only marginal review. 
Quoting the dissenting Opinion of Justice Murphy in Korematsu v United States,
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he opined that the maintenance of peace and security cannot preclude courts from 
exercising their function of review. The role of the judiciary in time of terrorism is 
twofold: to verify whether the claim that extraordinarily high security risks exist is 
substantiated, and also ensure that the measures adopted strike a proper balance 
between the nature of the security risk and the extent to which these measures 
encroach upon the fundamental rights of individuals.117
In contrast to the judgment of the CFI, the ECJ’s approach displays constitutional 
confidence and distrust towards any invasion on due process. Recalling the spirit of 
les Verts,
  Whilst the ECJ did not delve 
on the first point, it certainly agreed on the second. 
 
The response of the ECJ: Confidence and Distrust 
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113 However, some authors have sustained that the Security Council must comply with this 
principle when discharging its powers under Chapter VII. See e.g. F KIRGIS Jr, The Security 
Council’s First Fifty Years, (1995) 89 American Journal of International Law,  506-539 
(opining that, though a strict proportionality test cannot be applied, the Security Council is not 
empowered to adopted “excessive disproportional” measures).  
114 See Ayadi, op.cit. at para 104.  
115 See, to this effect, the Opinion of Judge Weeramantry in the Lockerbie case: ICJ Rep. 
1992,3, 66 &176< 94 ILR 478,549. For a more nuanced view, see M DAVID, Passport to 
Justice: Internationalizing the Political Question Doctrine for Application in the World Court, 
(1999) 40:1 Harvard International Law Journal, 81-150 who argues that the UNSC does not 
exclusive authority to determine whether a matter constitutes a threat to the international 
peace and security and that that authority it is shared with the General Assembly and the ICJ. 
Thus, she rejects that decisions adopted under Chapter VII are “non-justiciable”. The author 
favours a limited judicial review of the UNSC resolutions, which is tempered by a political 
question doctrine approach and takes account of “(a) matters relating to the exigency of the 
circumstances; (b) matters relating to the nature of the legal question raised; and (c) matters 
relating to the process by which the resolutions were adopted.” In her opinion, where the 
strength of the international norm at issue is significant, such as jus cogens, the Political 
Question Doctrine should not apply.  
116 323 US 214, 233-234 (1944). 
117 Maduro, Op.cit.,  para 35 of the Opinion. 
118 Case 294/83 Les Verts [1986] ECR 1339. 
 the Court began by stating that effective judicial protection is a general 
principle of Community law which emanates from the constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States and has been enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the 
ECHR. It also referred by way of supporting argument to Article 47 of the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, thus entrenching a recent tendency to view its provisions as 
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a legitimate source of inspiration despite the fact that, formally, it has no binding 
force.119
The Court held that the principle of judicial protection requires that the Community 
authorities must communicate to the persons concerned the grounds on which their 
names have been included in the sanctions list. The requirement to notify reasons 
serves both an instrumental and a rule of law – based rationale. It enables those 
affected to defend their rights and also facilitates the exercise of judicial review by the 
Court.
 
120 It agreed with the CFI that, in the circumstances of the case, advance 
communication to the appellants of the reasons for their inclusion in the sanctions 
lists or granting them in advance the right to be heard would prejudice the 
effectiveness of the sanctions. A freezing of assets order can only be effective if it 
has an element of surprise and no advance warning is given. The Court also 
accepted that overriding public policy considerations may militate against the 
communication of certain matters to the persons concerned and, therefore, against 
their being heard.121
This did not mean, however, that the contested economic sanctions would be 
immune from judicial review. This point was developed further by Maduro AG, who 
rejected the argument that the fight against terrorism is a “political question” unfit for 
judicial determination. Whilst conceding that the ECJ operates in an increasingly 
interdependent world where the authority of other international bodies must be 
recognised, the Advocate General highlighted that the Community judiciary cannot 
“turn its back on the fundamental values”
 The ECJ thus impliedly recognised the need for protecting 
information derived from intelligence sources.  
122 which it is bound to protect. Measures 
intended to suppress international terrorism cannot enjoy judicial immunity, the 
reason being that “the political process is liable to become overly responsive to 
immediate popular concerns, leading the authorities to allay the anxieties of the many 
at the expense of the rights of a few”123. This was echoed by the Court which found 
that it was the judiciary’s task to apply “techniques which accommodate, on the one 
hand, legitimate security concerns about the nature and sources of information taken 
into account in the adoption of the act concerned and, on the other, the need to 
accord the individual a sufficient measure of procedural justice”124
                                                        
119 Para 335; Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union, proclaimed on 7 
December 2000 in Nice, OJ 2000 C 364, p. 1. The ECJ broke its silence and referred to the 
Charter for the first time in Case C-540/03 Parliament v Council, judgment of 27 June 2006, 
para 38. For subsequent references, see e.g. Case C-432/05 Unibet [2007] ECR I-2271, para 
37; Case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v Leden van de Ministerraad, judgment 
of 3 May 2007, para 46; Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, judgment of 18 December 2007, para 91. 
120 Kadi, paras 336-337. This dual rationale has been reiterated in previous case law: See 
Case 222/86 Heylens and Others [1987] ECR 4097, para 15; Joined Cases C-189/02 P, 
C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P Dansk Rørindustri and Others v 
Commission [2005] ECR I-5425, paras 462 and 463. For a more general discussion of 
process rights see Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law, 2006, pp. 371 et seq. 
121 Para 342. 
122 Opinion of AG Maduro in Kadi, para. 44. 
123 Ibid, para. 45. 
124 Kadi (Appeal), para. 344. 
. Accordingly, the 
balance lay in mandating the Council to communicate inculpatory evidence against 
the appellants either concomitantly with the adoption of the contested regulation or 
within a reasonable period thereafter. Owing to the Council’s failure to do so, the ECJ 
ruled that the applicants’ right of defence, particularly their right to be heard, had 
been violated. Further, since the Court was deprived from investigating the evidence 
supporting the freezing of assets, it could not exercise review and, as a result, the 
right to effective judicial protection had also been breached. The Court identified the 
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source of violation as being both the statutory framework and the Council’s practice. 
Neither the contested regulation nor the CFSP Common Position which formed its 
basis provided for a procedure for the notification of evidence; furthermore, at no time 
did the Council inform the appellants of such evidence.  
The ECJ did not delve on the question whether, if reasons for the inclusion of the 
appellants’ names in the list had been provided ex posto facto, i.e. in the course of 
the judicial proceedings, the breach of fundamental rights would have been undone. 
It merely restricted itself to pointing out that the infringement had not been remedied 
in the course of the action as an additional reason for establishing a violation.125 If 
process rights, however, are to have any meaning, it is difficult to see how the 
requirement of reasoning can be complied with retrospectively.126
A distinct feature of the ECJ’s reasoning, which differentiates its approach from that 
of the CFI, is that it conceded little ground to the source of the security concerns, 
namely the fact that the sanctions originated from the UNSC. It accepted that the 
Community must respect international law and, in that context, attach “special 
importance” to UNSC resolutions
  
127 but this did not translate to granting any special 
status to Community measures adopted to comply with such resolutions when 
reviewing their compatibility with fundamental rights. Similarly, the ECJ accepted that 
it must balance “legitimate security concerns”128 and heed to “overriding 
considerations to do with safety or the conduct of the international relations of the 
Community and its Member States”129
In relation to the right to property, the Court recalled that it is not an absolute right 
and its exercise may be restricted subject to two conditions. Such restrictions must 
(a) pursue a public interest objective and (b) meet the standard of proportionality, i.e. 
they must not constitute a disproportionate and intolerable interference impairing the 
very substance of the right
 but by doing so, it emphasized the nature of 
the interests at stake rather than the UNSC as their ultimate exponent. The judgment 
is euro-centric rather than internationalist. 
130. The ECJ found that, in principle, such justification 
existed. Drawing on the case-law of the ECtHR, it acknowledged that the Community 
legislature enjoys a “great margin of appreciation” in choosing the means to attain 
public interest objectives and ascertaining their adequacy131
Nevertheless, the ECJ found that, as applied to Mr Kadi, the contested regulation 
breached the right to property because it violated due process standards which are 
. Referring to its 
judgment in Bosphorus, it stressed the importance of adopting effective measures to 
combat terrorism in order to maintain international peace and security and accepted 
that such an imperative objective may justify even substantial collateral effects on 
bona fide third parties. Accordingly, freezing of assets as a means of counter-
terrorism could not be qualified as a disproportionate restriction on the right to 
property. The Court took into account that, under the UN Sanctions scheme and the 
Community legislation giving effect to it, the freezing of funds to cover certain basic 
expenses could be lifted upon request of the affected parties. Furthermore, the 
UNSC resolutions provided for a mechanism of periodic re-examination of the 
sanctions imposed and a procedure whereby affected parties could raise their claims.  
 
                                                        
125 Para 350.  
126 This issue was examined also by the CFI in OMPI. See below. 
127 para 294. 
128 Para 344. 
129 Para 342. 
130 Kadi (appeal), para 355. 
131 See European Court of Human Rights, judgment in J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd. and J.A. Pye 
(Oxford) Land Ltd. v. United Kingdom of 30 August 2007, Reports of Judgments and 
Decisions 2007-0000, §§ 55 and 75. 
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an integral part of that right.132
Although the ECJ annulled the contested regulation, it decided to maintain 
temporarily its effects in relation to the appellants exercising its jurisdiction under 
Article 231 EC.
 In so far as it concerned Mr Kadi, the contested 
regulation was adopted without furnishing any guarantee enabling him to put his case 
to the competent authorities and therefore constituted an unjustified encroachment 
upon his right to property. 
 
Exploring the consequences of annulment 
 
133
The first question is not answered by the judgment. Whilst the ECJ declared that the 
Council had to communicate inculpatory evidence to the appellants, it also 
recognised the limiting effect of overriding considerations pertaining to security and 
the Community’s international relations. On that ground, one would expect that 
certain evidence may be withheld from the parties concerned or that the Council may 
be required to disclose it to the Court with a view to the latter determining whether it 
should be communicated to the applicants. Inevitably, the judgment in Kadi opens 
the road for security issues to be litigated before the Community judicature. The CFI 
judgments relating to Community, as opposed to UN, sanctions are more nuanced 
that the ECJ’s judgment in Kadi and may provide here some guidance.
 Since the regulation was vitiated by procedural rather than 
substantive defects, it could not be excluded that the imposition of sanctions on the 
appellants might prove to be justified. If the regulation was annulled with immediate 
effect, there was a risk that the appellants might take steps before a new regulation 
was enacted to avoid the refreezing of their funds. On that basis, the Court 
maintained its effects in force for a period of three months. Such use of Article 231 is 
neither novel nor controversial. The annulment of the regulation, however, raises a 
number of interesting issues. First, what is the precise scope of the ruling? In 
particular, would it be possible for the Council to refuse the disclosure of evidence to 
the parties concerned on security grounds? Secondly, might there be a possibility of 
a claim in damages following the annulment of the regulation? Finally, would it be 
possible for the UNSC resolution to be implemented not by means of a new 
Community regulation but by means of national measures adopted at Member State 
level? 
134
As regards the possibility of a damages claim, the ECJ found that the right to be 
heard and the right to judicial protection, albeit not the right to property, were 
“patently not respected”.
  
135 Such use of language may well open the way for a claim 
in damages by the successful appellants. Under the established case law, the 
Community may be liable for loss arising from normative action if there has been a 
serious violation of a rule of law intended to grant rights to individuals, the concept of 
serious violation being understood as a manifest and clear disregard of the limits of 
discretionary powers.136
                                                        
132 See, to that effect, the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Jokela v. 
Finland of 21 May 2002, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2002-IV, § 45 and case-law 
cited, and § 55. 
133 Article 231(2) states that, where it considers it necessary, the Court may state which of the 
effects of a regulation which it has declared void will be considered as definitive.  
134 See below. 
135 Para 334. 
136 See C-352/98 P Laboratoires Pharmaceutiques Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission 
[2000] ECR I-5291. 
 It is submitted, however, that, irrespective of other hurdles 
that an action in damages would encounter, the threshold of seriousness is highly 
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unlikely to be met in this case. Any attempt here to broaden the conditions of 
institutional liability would be unwise.137
The third question raises some interesting issues. The effect of the annulment of the 
contested regulation is that the Member States are in breach of their obligations 
under the UN Charter. To rectify the breach, it falls on them to adopt new legislation 
to transpose the UNSC resolutions and they can do so either separately by means of 
national legislation or acting together through the Community. It could be argued that 
competence to adopt economic sanctions is an exclusive Community competence 
and, consequently, the Member States could not step in to implement the resolutions. 
It will be remembered that in Ayadi the CFI left open the issue whether the 
Community competence under Articles 60 and 301 is exclusive although it clearly 
found no place for the principle of subsidiarity in the application of these 
provisions.
 
 
138 In the ECJ’s reasoning, competence could not be established for the 
adoption of the contested regulation without recourse to Article 308. This suggests 
that the Community’s competence to adopt the contested sanctions is shared with 
that of the Member States since competence under the residual clause of Article 308 
is ex hypothesi shared. Furthermore, in adopting a common position under CFSP, 
Member States are not bound to entrust its implementation to the Community. They 
are, in principle, free to mandate the Member States to take action at the national 
level. If so, it would be open to governments to implement the UNSC resolutions by 
adopting a new CFSP common position which no longer provided for Community 
action via Articles 60, 301 and 308 but for action at national level.139
                                                        
137 The detailed examination of a possible claim in damages falls beyond the scope of this 
article. Suffice it to make here the following points. First and foremost, the adoption of the 
contested regulation does not appear to exceed manifestly and gravely the limits of the 
Council’s discretion given the novelty of the issue, the importance of anti-terrorist policies, and 
the fact that the ECJ had never before examined the effect of UNSC resolutions in the EC 
legal order and their effects on fundamental rights. Further, the establishment of causal link 
would not be straightforward but would not be impossible although previous case law may 
stand against it. Since the sanctions were adopted to comply with UNSC resolutions, failure to 
heed which would expose the Member States to liability under international law, it might be 
arguable that any loss suffered by the claimants would be attributable not to the EC but the 
UN. This is the position taken by the CFI in T-184/95 Dorsch Consult Ingenieurgesellschaft v 
Council, [1998] ECR II-667 (confirmed on appeal on other points: C- 237/98 [2000] I-4549), 
and also in Hassan, op.cit. another economic sanctions case decided by the CFI after Kadi. In 
that case, the applicant also sought damages but his application was rejected, inter alia, on 
the ground that, even if there had been illegal conduct and loss, which the CFI rejected, such 
loss was causually connected not to the adoption of  Community legislation but to the UNSC 
to which the legislation gave effect. Neither case however provides an absolute bar. Dorsch 
can be distinguished form Kadi because it concerned a claim in damages for lawful action, as 
opposed to a violation of law. Furthermore, attributing any injurious consequences to the UN 
rather than the EC does not fit well with the express statement of the ECJ in Kadi that the UN 
Charter does not impose on its Member States the choice of a particular model for the 
implementation of UNSC resolutions (para 298). See further below Sison. 
138 Above. 
139 A possible limitation to that course of action might be imposed by the duty of loyalty, laid 
down in Article 10 EC, which is pervasive in EC law. It might be argued that delegating the 
implementation of the UNSC resolutions and CFSP common positions to the Member States 
rather than to the Community would run counter to the judgment in Kadi where the ECJ 
already acknowledged the risk to intra-state trade if the sanctions were implemented 
unilaterally. 
 But this is not 
the end of the inquiry. A related question is this: assuming that it were open to the 
Member States to implement the UNSC resolutions by national measures, would 
such measures be required to comply with fundamental rights as protected in 
Community law? It is highly arguable that they would. By taking implementing 
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measures, the Member States would be acting within the scope of Community law for 
the purposes of the application of fundamental rights,140 since in Kadi, for good or for 
bad, the ECJ already acknowledged that unilateral action at national level was liable 
to interfere with free movement of capital and payments and the right of 
establishment and also create distortions in the conditions of competition. There is 
also an additional consideration. The principle of separation of powers, which is itself 
enshrined in Article 220 EC, requires that it should not be possible for Member States 
to escape judicial review and evade a judgment of the ECJ, by implementing a CFSP 
common position at national level, in circumstances where the ECJ has already 
declared that its implementation by the Community fails to respect fundamental 
rights.141
The CFI had the opportunity to examine challenges against economic sanctions 
imposed by the European Community in a number of cases which were decided after 
its judgment in Kadi but before the ECJ delivered its judgment in that case. These 
cases differ from Kadi in that the contested lists were not adopted at UN level but by 
the Community institutions acting in implementation of UNSC resolutions drafted in 
more general terms. The leading case in this category is Organisation des 
Modjahedines du people d’Iran (OMPI) v Council
 
 
Sanctions Lists established by the EC 
 
142
The origins of these cases lie in UNSC Resolution 1373 (2001) which provided for 
strategies to combat the financing of terrorism. Paragraph 1(c) states that all States 
must freeze without delay funds and other financial assets or economic resources of 
persons who are associated with terrorism.
 but, before discussing the 
judgments in detail, it is necessary to present briefly the legislative background.  
 
143 The resolution was implemented in the 
EU by Common Position 2001/930/CFSP on combating terrorism144 and Common 
Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat 
terrorism145
Articles 2 and 3 of Common Position 2001/931 mandate the European Community to 
order the freezing of funds and other economic resources of persons, groups and 
entities listed in the Annex. The key provision is that of Article 1(4) which states that 
the list in the Annex is to be drawn up on the basis of precise information which 
indicates that a decision has been taken by a competent authority in respect of the 
persons concerned, irrespective of whether it relates to the instigation of 
investigations or prosecution for a terrorist act, or an attempt to perpetrate, 
participate or facilitate such an act. The decision must be based on serious and 
.  
 
                                                        
140 See Case C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925; Case C-71/02 Herbert Karner Industrie-
Auktionen GmbH v Troostwijk GmbH [2004] ECR I-3025. 
141 A further argument may be derived from Article 307(2). If the Member States were 
required to introduce sanctions in their domestic law so as to comply with their international 
responsibilities under the UN Charter, they would still be under an obligation pursuant to 
Article 307(2) EC, to eliminate any incompatibilities with EC law and therefore respect 
fundamental rights as interpreted by the ECJ. 
142 Case T-228/02 Organisation des Modjahedines du people d’Iran (OMPI) v Council, [2006] 
ECR II-4665. 
143 Under the terms of paragraph 1(c), the sanctions apply to persons who commit, or attempt 
to commit, terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts; of 
entities owned or controlled by such persons; and of persons and entities acting on behalf of, 
or at the direction of, such persons and entities. 
144 OJ 2001 L 344, p. 90. 
145 OJ 2001 L 344, p. 93. 
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credible evidence or clues, or condemnation for such deeds. “Competent authority” is 
understood to mean a judicial authority or, where judicial authorities have no 
competence in the relevant area, an equivalent authority. According to Article 1(6), 
the names of persons and entities in the list in the Annex are to be reviewed at 
regular intervals and at least once every six months to ensure that there are grounds 
for keeping them in the list.  
 
Common Position 2001/931 was transposed into Community law by Council 
Regulation No 2580/2001.146 Article 2 of the Regulation provides for the freezing of 
assets of the persons, groups and entities included in a sanctions list which is to be 
determined by a Council Decision. It also mandates the Council, acting by unanimity, 
to establish, review and amend that list in accordance with the provisions laid down 
in Common Position 2001/931.147 Since the initial sanctions list which was introduced 
in December 2001,148
The applicants in OMPI,
 the Council has adopted various common positions and 
decisions updating the lists respectively provided by the Common Position 2001/931 
and Regulation No 2580/2001.   
 
149 KONGRA-GEL,150 PKK,151 Al-Aqsa,152 and Sison153 had 
their names included in sanction lists and brought proceedings before the CFI 
seeking their annulment.154
                                                        
146 Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001 on specific restrictive 
measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism (OJ 
2001 L 344, p. 70. That regulation, as the contested regulation in Kadi and Yusuf, was 
adopted on the basis of Articles 60 EC, 301 EC and 308 EC. 
147 Article 2 of the Regulation provides in full as follows: 
>1. Except as permitted under Articles 5 and 6: 
(a) all funds, other financial assets and economic resources belonging to, or owned or held 
by, a natural or legal person, group or entity included in the list referred to in paragraph 3 shall 
be frozen; 
(b) no funds, other financial assets and economic resources shall be made available, directly 
or indirectly, to, or for the benefit of, a natural or legal person, group or entity included in the 
list referred to in paragraph 3. 
2. Except as permitted under Articles 5 and 6, it shall be prohibited to provide financial 
services to, or for the benefit of, a natural or legal person, group or entity included in the list 
referred to in paragraph 3. 
3. The Council, acting by unanimity, shall establish, review and amend the list of persons, 
groups and entities to which this Regulation applies, in accordance with the provisions laid 
down in Article 1(4), (5) and (6) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP; such list shall consist 
of: 
(i) natural persons committing, or attempting to commit, participating in or facilitating the 
commission of any act of terrorism; 
(ii) legal persons, groups or entities committing, or attempting to commit, participating in or 
facilitating the commission of any act of terrorism; 
(iii) legal persons, groups or entities owned or controlled by one or more natural or legal 
persons, groups or entities referred to in points (i) and (ii); or 
(iv) natural legal persons, groups or entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of one or 
more natural or legal persons, groups or entities referred to in points (i) and (ii).= 
148 See Council Decision 2001/927/EC of 27 December 2001 establishing the list provided for 
in Article 2(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 (OJ 2001 L 344, p. 83).  
 
149 Op.cit. 
150 Case T-253/04 KONGRA-GEL, judgment of 3 April 2008. 
151 Case T-229/02 Osman Ocalan on behalf of PKK v Council, judgment on 3 April 2008. 
152 Case T-327/03 Stichting Al-Aqsa v Council, judgment of 11 July 2007. 
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The basic findings made by the CFI may be summarized by reference to the 
judgment in OMPI. The CFI held that the Community standards for the protection of 
fundamental rights applied in relation to the contested measures. It distinguished the 
case from Kadi on the ground that, in Kadi, the Community institutions had merely 
implemented resolutions of the UNSC and decisions of its Sanctions Committee 
which did not authorise the Community to provide for any mechanism for the 
examination of individual situations. In OMPI, by contrast, although UNSC Resolution 
1373 (2001) provided that all States must freeze terrorist assets, it did not specify 
individually the persons and entities who were to be subject of the sanctions. Thus, 
the Community acts which specifically applied the sanctions did not come within the 
exercise of Community circumscribed powers and were not covered by the principle 
of primacy of UN law under Article 103 of the UN Charter.155
The CFI’s analysis in OMPI was more detailed and nuanced than the ECJ’s 
approach in Kadi so much so that it makes OMPI one of the most important 
judgments delivered by the Community courts on the right to a hearing. The CFI 
began by recalling that, in principle, the right to be heard requires, first, that the party 
concerned must be informed of the evidence adduced against it and, secondly, be 
afforded the opportunity to respond effectively. It took the view that the contested 
measure was not a true legislative act of general application in relation to which the 
persons affected do not have the right to be heard. It accepted that the contested 
Council decision freezing the assets of the applicants had the same general scope as 
Regulation 2580/2001 and was an integral part of it but held that the regulation was 
not of an exclusively legislative nature: although it was of general application it was of 
direct and individual concern to the applicant, to whom it referred by name. It also 
rejected the argument that the right to a hearing should be denied to the parties 
concerned solely on the ground that neither the ECHR nor the general principles of 
Community law confer on individuals any right whatsoever to be heard before the 
adoption of an act of a legislative nature.
 The CFI then proceeded 
to examine the requirements of the right to a hearing, the duty to give reasons and 
the right to judicial protection and found that they were breached.  
 
Following the ECJ’s judgment in Kadi, this distinction between sanctions lists dictated 
by the UN and those established by the EU is no longer material for the purposes of 
determining the application of EC human rights standards. It is nonetheless 
interesting to discuss in more detail the CFI findings in OMPI and its progeny as the 
legislative framework of the sanctions in those cases was different.  
 
The Right to a Hearing 
 
156
                                                                                                                                                              
153 Case T-47/03 Sison v Council, judgment of 11 July 2007.  
154 In OMPI, the applicant was an organisation founded in 1965 seeking regime change in 
Iran. In Ocalan, the applicant challenged the imposition of sanctions against the Kurdistan 
Workers Party (PKK),a political organization established in 1978 with the objective of seeking 
the Kurds right to self-determination. In KONGRA-GEL, the applicants were the People’s 
Congress of Kurdistan considered to be an alias of the PKK, In Al-Aqsa the applicant was an 
Islamic social welfare foundation governed by Netherlands law. In Sison the applicant was the 
head of the Communist Party of the Philippines.  
155 OMPI, op.cit., paras 99-102.  
156 OMPI, op.cit., paras 95-98.  
 Thus, the CFI extended the application of 
the right to a hearing to economic sanctions imposed in the interests of preventing 
terrorism and, consistently with Article 52(3) of the EU Charter, appeared to view the 
ECHR as providing a minimum rather than a maximum of human rights protection in 
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the EU legal order. It will be remembered that this view was essentially endorsed by 
the ECJ in Kadi.157
The CFI also pointed out that the Security Council had not established any specific 
rules concerning the procedures for freezing funds, or safeguards or judicial 
remedies to ensure the protection of the persons affected.
 
 
158 The significance of this 
statement is not clear but appears to suggest that, if the UN had established 
procedures and remedies in relation to the imposition of economic sanctions, the CFI 
would have taken them into account in determining whether the Community 
standards were properly adhered to. In a similar spirit, the ECJ in Kadi rejected the 
argument that it should abstain from judicial review on the ground that UN sanctions 
procedures provided alternative protection on the ground that those procedures were 
diplomatic rather than judicial in character.159 Nevertheless, the degree to which the 
ECJ might accept the UN as a proxy for the safeguarding of fundamental rights, if 
due process were more developed at UN level, remains an open question.160
By contrast, the right to a hearing has a relatively limited scope in the second phase 
of the procedure, which unravels at Community level. The party concerned must be 
afforded the opportunity to make his views known only on whether there is specific 
information in the file which shows that a decision meeting the definition laid down in 
  
 
The CFI drew a distinction between the initial decision to freeze assets and the 
subsequent decisions to maintain the sanctions. The procedure leading to the initial 
decision is taken at two levels, one national and the other Community. In the first 
stage, in accordance with Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931, a competent 
national authority must take a decision that the party concerned is associated with 
terrorist acts. That decision must be based on serious and credible evidence or 
clues. In the second stage, the Council acting unanimously must decide to include 
the party concerned in the list on the basis of precise information which indicates that 
such a national decision has been taken.  
 
The CFI held that the right to a fair hearing must be safeguarded primarily in the first 
stage, i.e. before the national authorities. It is at that stage that the party concerned 
must be placed in a position in which he can effectively present his views on the 
evidence, subject to possible restrictions on the right to a fair hearing which are 
justified in national law on grounds of public policy, public security or the 
maintenance of international relations.  
 
                                                        
157 See Kadi, op.cit., paras 316-317 and above. 
158 OMPI, op.cit., paras 99-102. 
159 Above. 
160 It will be remembered that in Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. 
Ireland (45036/98) (2006) 42 EHRR 1, the ECtHR accepted that action taken by the 
contracting states to comply with obligations flowing form membership to international 
organisations was justified on condition that such organisations provided protection to 
fundamental rights which was equivalent to that offered by the Convention both as regards 
substantive guarantees and mechanisms controlling their observance. It could be argued that 
the ECJ should afford similar comity-based respect to any standards elaborated at UN level. 
This will facilitate respect for the primacy of UN law whilst ensuring respect for the rule of law 
and encouraging the development of common standards at global level. There are doctrinal 
objections to such an approach, albeit they are not insuperable. This kind of deference to 
standards of other international organisations might not be appropriate to a legal order, such 
as the EU, which does not restrict itself to providing only minimum standards for the 
protection of fundamental rights and which, moreover, professes to be an autonomous legal 
order as opposed to a mere international agreement: see here the observations of Maduro 
AG, op.cit, paras 21 & 37. 
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Article 4(1) of Common Position 2001/931 was taken at national level. Observance of 
the right to a fair hearing does not in principle require that the party concerned be 
afforded again at that stage the opportunity to express his views on the 
appropriateness and well-foundedness of that decision, as those questions may only 
be raised at national level. Likewise, in principle, it is not for the Council to decide 
whether the proceedings opened against the party concerned and resulting in that 
decision, as provided for by the national law of the relevant Member State, was 
conducted correctly, or whether the fundamental rights of the party concerned were 
respected by the national authorities. That power belongs exclusively to the 
competent national courts under the oversight of the European Court of Human 
Rights.161
The CFI, however, provided for an exception from this deferential approach. It held 
that the above considerations are valid only in so far as the evidence or clues in 
question were in fact assessed by the competent national authority. If, in the course 
of the procedure before it, the Council bases its initial decision or a subsequent 
decision to freeze funds on information or evidence communicated to it by 
representatives of the Member States without it having been assessed by the 
competent national authority, that information must be considered as newly-adduced 
evidence which must, in principle, be the subject of notification and a hearing at 
Community level, not having already been so at national level.
 
 
The CFI based this limitation of its review function on the principle of sincere 
cooperation provided in Article 10 EC which underpins the whole EU legal order. It 
held that Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931 and Article 2(3) of Regulation No 
2580/2001 introduce a specific form of cooperation between the Council and the 
Member States in the context of combating terrorism. In that context, the principle of 
sincere cooperation entails, for the Council, the obligation to defer as far as possible 
to the assessment conducted by the competent national authority, at least where it is 
a judicial authority, both in respect of the issue of whether there are “serious and 
credible evidence or clues” on which its decision is based and in respect of 
recognising potential restrictions on access to the evidence on grounds of public 
policy, public security or the maintenance of international relations. 
 
162
It appears that, at the very least, the Council must afford to the person concerned the 
opportunity to express its views if it bases its decision on information or evidence 
communicated to it by representatives of the Member States without it having been 
assessed by the competent national authority. This exception is based on the 
understanding that the Council is not bound by the EU Common Position, i.e. it does 
not have to include in the list all the persons included in the Common Position.
 The CFI appears to 
leave itself here sufficient margin of manoeuvring to intervene in exceptional 
circumstances but the scope of this exception is somewhat ambiguous. It is not clear 
whether it is open to the applicant to argue in all cases that the evidence was not in 
fact assessed properly by the national authority, i.e. that the national authority did not 
follow the requisite degree of scrutiny and care. If so, the way is open for the CFI to 
revisit the national proceedings with a view to determining whether the Council had 
power to include the party’s name in the list, thus undermining the duty of 
cooperation on the basis of which the CFI limited its own role.  
 
163
                                                        
161 OMPI, op. cit., para 121. The CFI derived support for those findings from  Case T-353/00 
Le Pen v Parliament [2003] ECR II-1729, para 91, upheld on appeal: Case C-208/03 P Le 
Pen v Parliament [2005] ECR I-6051. 
162 OMPI, op cit, Para 126. 
 It 
163 The CFI also held that, when the Community implemented the EU Common Position, it did 
not act under powers circumscribed by the will of the Union or that of its Member States. It 
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follows that, in deciding whether to include a particular person or entity in the list, it 
exercises discretion and may take account of information not placed before the 
national competent authority. In such a case therefore it must afford to the person 
concerned the right to express his views thus closing the remedial gap left by the lack 
of intervention of the national authority.  
 
Despite the purposeful reiteration of the application of the right to a hearing as a 
matter of principle, the CFI recognised that it is subject to comprehensive limitations 
in the interests of the overriding requirement of public security. These limitations 
concern the timing of notification of the evidence, the type of evidence that may be 
notified, and the opportunity to present views on the evidence. In short, they 
permeate all its aspects. 
 
Understandably, the CFI held that notifying the evidence and granting a hearing 
before the adoption of the decision to freeze funds would be liable to jeopardise the 
effectiveness of the sanctions and thus incompatible with the public interest objective 
of preventing terrorism: An initial measure freezing funds must, by its very nature, be 
able to benefit from a surprise effect and to be applied with immediate effect. Such a 
measure cannot, therefore, be the subject-matter of notification before it is 
implemented.164 However, the evidence must be notified to the party concerned, in 
so far as reasonably possible, either concomitantly with or as soon as possible after 
the adoption of the initial decision to freeze funds165. The CFI also accepted that, 
although in principle the parties concerned must have the opportunity to request an 
immediate re-examination of the initial measure freezing their funds, such a hearing 
after the event is not automatically required in the context of an initial decision to 
freeze funds. The requirements of the rule of law are safeguarded by their right to 
seek judicial review before the CFI.166
With regard to the evidence to be notified, the CFI recognised that overriding security 
concerns or considerations relating to the conduct of the international relations of the 
Community and its Member States may preclude the communication of certain 
evidence to the parties concerned and, therefore the hearing of those parties with 
regard to such evidence.
  
 
167 The CFI took the view that such restrictions are 
consistent with the constitutional traditions of the Member States and the case law of 
the ECtHR.168
                                                                                                                                                              
derived this from the wording of Article 301 EC, according to which the Council is to decide on 
the matter “by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission”, and that of Article 
60(1) EC, according to which the Council “may take”, following the same procedure, the 
urgent measures necessary for an act under the CFSP. 
 
164 See OMPI, op.cit, para 128; Sison, op cit, para 175; Yusuf, op.cit., para 308; This was 
endorsed by the ECJ in Kadi, see above. 
165 OMPI, op.cit., para 129. 
166 Op.cit., para 130. The above limitations do not apply to subsequent Council decisions 
maintaining the freezing of funds. Once assets have been frozen, it is no longer necessary to 
ensure a surprise effect to guarantee the effectiveness of the sanctions so that any 
subsequent decision maintaining the sanction must be preceded by the possibility of a further 
hearing and, where appropriate, notification of any new evidence. This obligation applies 
irrespective of whether the persons concerned expressly made a prior request to be heard: 
op.cit., paras 131-132. 
167 Op.cit., para 133. 
168 See e.g. Chahal v United Kingdom, judgment of 15 November 1996, Report 1996-V, ' 
131, and Jasper v United Kingdom, judgment of 16 February 2000, No 27052/95, '' 51 to 53; 
see also Article IX.3 of the Guidelines adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe, referred to in paragraph 111 above.  
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The CFI then proceeded to indicate the type of evidence whose communication may 
be restricted in the circumstances of the case. It held that the restrictions apply 
primarily to the “serious and credible evidence or clues” on which the national 
decision to instigate an investigation or prosecution is based but they may 
conceivably also apply to the specific content or the particular grounds for that 
decision, or even the identity of the authority that took it. It is even possible that, in 
very specific circumstances, the identification of the Member State or third country in 
which a competent authority has taken a decision in respect of a person may be 
liable to jeopardise public security, by providing the party concerned with sensitive 
information which it could misuse.169
It follows from the above that, in view of public security concerns, the right to a 
hearing is reduced in practice to a right to be notified of the evidence concomitantly, 
or as soon as possible thereafter, of the adoption of the economic sanction. The right 
to be heard after that is not “automatically” recognized. Given such severe limitations 
on the right to be heard, the requirement to state reasons becomes the central 
aspect of due process. Recalling established case law, the CFI held that the 
statement of reasons must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning 
followed by the author of the measure in such a way as to enable the persons 
concerned to ascertain the reasons for it and enable the competent court to exercise 
its power of review. The specific stipulations flowing from the requirement of 
reasoning depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the 
measure in question, the nature of the reasons given, and the interest which the 
addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual 
concern, may have in obtaining explanations.
 
 
The obligation to state reasons 
 
170
In relation to decisions imposing economic sanctions, the CFI rejected the argument 
that the statement of reasons may consist merely of a general, stereotypical 
formulation. The Council is required to indicate the actual and specific reasons why it 
considers that the relevant rules are applicable to the party concerned.
 
 
171 This 
entails, in principle, that the statement of reasons must at least refer to the precise 
information or material in the relevant file which indicates that a decision has been 
taken by a national competent authority in respect of the person concerned172
                                                        
169 Op.cit., para 136. 
170 See e.g. OMPI, op. cit.,  para 141, KONGRA-GEL, op. cit,  para 95; Al-Aqsa , op. cit., para 
58.  See also Case 125/80 Arning v Commission [1981] ECR 2539, para 13; Case C-367/95 
P Commission v Sytraval and Brink=s France [1998] ECR I-1719, para 63; Case C-301/96 
Germany v Commission [2003] ECR I-9919, para 87; Case C-42/01 Portugal v Commission 
[2004] ECR I-6079, para 66; and Joined Cases T-228/99 and T-233/99 Westdeutsche 
Landesbank Girozentrale and Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Commission [2003] ECR II-435, 
paras278 to 280. 
171 See Cases T-117/01 Roman Parra v Commission [2002] ECR-SC I-A-27 and II-121, para 
31, and T-218/02 Napoli Buzzanca v Commission [2005] ECR II-1221 ,para 74. 
172 OMPI, para 144. 
 or, if 
the Council based its decision on information communicated to it by the Member 
States without it having been assessed by the national authority, then it must indicate 
why it considers that this information justifies the inclusion of the person concerned in 
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the list.173 This formulation appears to suggest that the Council is under an obligation 
to show that it was satisfied that the national authority assessed the evidence.174
Furthermore, given that the Council has discretion on which persons to include in the 
list,
  
 
175 the statement of reasons must refer not only to the statutory conditions of 
application of that regulation, but also the reasons why the Council considers, in the 
exercise of its discretion, that such a measure must be adopted in respect of the 
party concerned.176 Finally, the CFI confirmed that the statement of reasons must in 
principle be notified to the person concerned at the same time as the act adversely 
affecting him. A failure to state the reasons cannot be remedied ex posto facto by 
notifying the person concerned of the reasons during the proceedings before the 
Community Courts.177
The CFI accepted, however, that the requirement to give reasons is subject mutatis 
mutandis to the same limitations on overriding grounds as those applicable to the 
right to a hearing. Considerations concerning the security of the Community and its 
Member States, or the conduct of their international relations, may preclude 
disclosure to the parties concerned of the specific and complete reasons for the initial 
or subsequent decision to freeze their funds. Thus, the Council may be precluded 
from, first, disclosing the serious and credible evidence or clues on which the national 
decision to instigate an investigation or prosecution is based; secondly, even from 
referring in detail to the specific content or the particular grounds of that decision, and 
thirdly, “in very specific circumstances”, from disclosing the identity of the Member 
State or third country in which a competent authority has taken the decision in 
question.
 
 
178
The CFI’s findings at the level of principle are characterised by an unusual degree of 
equivocation. On the one hand, it is keen to assert the application of procedural 
rights and confirm that any concept of emergency constitution is internalised, i.e. 
remains subject to the prerequisites for human rights protection provided for by the 
Community legal order.
  
 
179
                                                        
173 See OMPI, para 144 in conjunction with paras 125- 126 of the judgment. 
174 The statement of reasons for a subsequent decision to freeze funds must indicate the 
actual and specific reasons why the Council considers, following re-examination, that there 
are still grounds for the freezing of the funds of the party concerned, where appropriate on the 
basis of fresh information or evidence. Furthermore, when the grounds of such a subsequent 
decision are in essence the same as those already relied on when a previous decision was 
adopted, a mere statement to that effect may suffice, particularly when the party concerned is 
a group or entity. See OMPI, op cit., para 151  KONGRA- GEL para 97.  
175 The CFI held that, when unanimously adopting a measure to freeze funds under 
Regulation No 2580/2001, the Council does not act under circumscribed powers. Article 2(3) 
of Regulation No 2580/2001, read together with Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931, is 
not to be construed as meaning that the Council is obliged to include in the disputed list any 
person in respect of whom a decision has been taken by a competent authority within the 
meaning of those provisions. This interpretation is confirmed by Article 1(6) of Common 
Position 2001/931, to which Article 2(3) of Regulation No 2580/2001 also refers, and 
according to which the Council is to conduct a >review= at regular intervals, at least once 
every six months, to ensure that >there are grounds= for keeping the parties concerned in the 
disputed list.  
176  Op.cit., para 146. 
177 See for previous case law, Case 195/80 Michel v Parliament [1981] ECR 2861, paragraph 
22, and Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission, paragraph 138 above, paragraph 463.  
178 See OMPI, op.cit., paras 148 and 136.  
 On the other hand, the scope for exceptions, which are 
179 In establishing the permissible exceptions from the requirement to give reasons, the CFI 
drew inspiration from Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their 
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recognised as coterminous for both the right to a hearing and the requirement to give 
reasons, is vast. Although the assessment of whether overriding grounds preclude a 
statement of reasons is reviewable by the CFI, it appears from the judgment that, in 
exceptional circumstances, public security interests may justify the non-disclosure of 
the complete evidence.  
 
Notably, the CFI recognised that limitations may be justified not only on grounds of 
public security but also in the interests of the conduct of the international relations of 
the Community and its Member States.180
The CFI held that effective judicial protection is ensured by the right of the parties 
concerned to challenge a decision imposing a freezing of assets under Article 230(4) 
EC.
 Whilst it is not certain whether the degree 
of scrutiny that the Court will be prepared to undertake will be the same in the case of 
the second ground as in the first, the recognition of the integrity of international 
relations as an independent source of derogations may provide vital breathing space 
for the political decision makers where evidence emanates from intelligence provided 
by third states. 
 
The Right to judicial protection 
 
181 It also held that its power of review extends to the assessment of the facts 
relied on as justifying the imposition of a sanction and the evidence on which that 
assessment is based. The Court must ensure observance of the right to a fair 
hearing and the requirement of reasoning. It must, moreover, assess that the 
overriding considerations relied on exceptionally by the Council in order to derogate 
from those rights are well founded.182 In the circumstances of the case, and owing to 
the limitations imposed on procedural rights, the CFI pointed out that judicial review 
is all the more imperative being the only procedural safeguard ensuring that a fair 
balance is struck between the need to combat international terrorism and the 
protection of fundamental rights.183 The Community Courts must thus be able to 
review the lawfulness and merits of the measures to freeze funds without it being 
possible to raise objections that the evidence and information used by the Council is 
secret or confidential. The CFI thus put at rest the view that the executive may 
withhold evidence from the court or that they may oust the jurisdiction of a judicial 
body by invoking public security prerogative.184 It left however open the question 
whether the confidential information may be provided only to the CFI or be made 
available also to the lawyers of the applicant. This was a separate issue on which it 
was not necessary for the Court to rule in the present action.185
                                                                                                                                                              
family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States (OJ 2004 
L 158, p. 77) and its predecessor Directive 64/221/EEC both in relation the requirement of 
reasoning and in relation to the right to judicial review: see OMPI paras 141, 157. The 
reference to the Migrant Workers Directive and the established case law of the ECJ under it 
suggests that, in contrast to the position in Kadi, in matters falling within EU discretionary 
powers the CFI uses existing derogations to accommodate the threat of terrorism and, at 
least methodologically, does not view it as a super-derogation. 
180 See OMPI, para 148. 
181 The adequacy of a challenge under Article 230(4) EC has also been accepted by the 
ECtHR. See Bosphorus v Ireland, judgment of 30 June 2005, No 45036/98, para ' 165. 
182 OMPI, op.cit., para 154. 
183 Op.cit., para 155. 
184 This view finds support in the case law of the ECTHR. See e.g. Chahal v United Kingdom, 
para 135; Öcalan v Turkey, judgment of 12 March 2003, No 46221/99, para 106. 
 
185 See, in this context, Chahal v United Kingdom, paras 131 and 144; Tinnelly & Sons and 
Others and McElduff and Others v United Kingdom, paras 49, 51, 52 and 78; Jasper v United 
Kingdom, paras 51 to 53; and Al-Nashif v Bulgaria, judgment of 20 June 2002, No 50963/99, 
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The CFI acknowledged limitations on its power of review. First, it accepted that the 
Council enjoys broad discretion in adopting economic sanctions in implementation of 
CFSP policies. Secondly, it conceded that the Community Courts may not substitute 
their assessment of the evidence, facts and circumstances justifying the adoption of 
such measures for that of the Council. Thirdly, it held that the review carried out by 
the Court of the lawfulness of decisions to freeze funds must be restricted to 
checking that the rules governing procedure and the statement of reasons have been 
complied with, that the facts are materially accurate, and that there has been no 
manifest error of assessment of the facts or misuse of power. That limited review 
applies, especially, to the Council’s assessment of whether the imposition of 
penalties was appropriate in the circumstances and the factors that it took into 
account in this context.186
Similarly, the CFI found that the requirement to state reasons had been violated. It 
placed particular emphasis on the fact that the complete lack of statement of reasons 
prevented it from exercising its function of judicial review. A distinct feature of the 
case was that, at the hearing, the Council and the United Kingdom were not able to 
explain to the Court on the basis of which national decision the contested decision 
had been adopted
 
 
From principles to outcomes 
 
In OMPI, the CFI came to the conclusion that the contested decision breached of the 
right to a hearing, the requirement to state reasons and the right to judicial review. 
The applicant had not been notified of the evidence against it before proceedings 
commenced. Neither the initial decision to freeze its assets nor the subsequent 
decisions maintaining the freezing mentioned the “specific information” or “material in 
the file“ showing that a decision justifying its inclusion in the disputed list had been 
taken by a competent national authority. 
 
187. The CFI stressed that the possibility of communicating the 
reasons after the application to the Court has been filed cannot not fulfil the 
requirements of the right to a hearing.188 The statement of reasons must appear in 
the contested decision or be provided “immediately thereafter”,189 and must be 
“actual and specific”.190
                                                                                                                                                              
paras 95 to 97, and also Article IX.4 of the Guidelines adopted by the Committee of Ministers 
of the Council of Europe. 
186 Para 159. and, to that effect, Eur. Court H.R., Leander v Sweden, judgment of 26 March 
1987, Series A No 116, ' 59, and Al-Nashif v Bulgaria, paragraph 158 above, 123 and 124). 
187 Ths was also the case in Sison, op. cit.: see para 224 of the judgment. 
188 See OMPI, op.cit., para 139; KONGRA-GEL,op.cit., paras 99-101; This is the established 
case law of the Community courts: see e.g. Case 195/80 Michel v Parliament [1981] ECR 
2861, para 22, Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission, para 463.  The communication 
of the reasons during the proceedings places the applicant at a disadvantage since he cannot 
contest the reasoning when he files the application. The principle of equality of the parties 
before the Community Courts would accordingly be affected. See Case T-132/03 Casini v 
Commission [2005] ECR II-0000, para 33, and Napoli Buzzanca v Commission, para 62.  
189 KONGRA-GEL, op.cit., para 102. 
 
190 Al Asqa, opc.it., para 61. In Al-Aqsa the Council and the Dutch Government had argued 
that specific reasoning was not required since the applicants were well aware of the 
circumstances leading to their inclusion in the list. Their resources had been frozen by 
sanctions regulations of the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs adopted under national anti-
terrorist legislation before, and in anticipation of, the adoption of the contested Community 
sanctions list. The applicant had unsuccessfully sought the annulment of the Dutch decision 
before a Dutch court. They were thus aware that the contested decision had been adopted in 
the light of the Dutch court order The CFI dismissed that submission on the ground that it was 
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In KONGRA-GEL, PKK and Al-Aqsa the CFI also annulled the contested sanctions 
but based its judgment solely on breach of the right to reasoning.191 The exclusive 
reliance on the requirement to give reasons does not seem attributable to the fact 
that the cases were heard by a different chamber192 and appears to be a sign of the 
Court refining its reasoning.193
Notably, in Sison the CFI dissociated the right to receive evidence from the right of 
access to documents flowing from the principle of transparency. It held that the fact 
that Council had legitimately refused to disclose under Regulation 1049/2001
 In fact, given the severe limitations on the right to 
hearing recognized by the CFI and the fact that it may be reduced to no more than 
the right to be notified of the evidence at the time when the decision is adopted, it is 
difficult to see what it adds to the requirement to give reasons. 
194 
certain documents requested by the applicant on the ground that they were 
confidential195 did not exonerate it from notifying the evidence adduced against the 
applicant. The public’s right to access to documents is subject to different limitations 
than those applicable when the rights of defence are at stake196
A final point may be made here in relation to possible claims in damages. In Sison, 
the CFI annulled the inclusion of the applicant’s name in the list drawn up by the EU 
but dismissed the action in damages.
. 
 
Damages claims 
 
197
                                                                                                                                                              
based not only on mere speculation as to what the applicant might have been aware of but 
also on the mistaken premise that there was a clear and unambiguous link between the court 
order and the adoption of the contested. In the circumstances of the case, the mere fact that 
the applicant knew of the court did not suffice to mitigate the lack of reasoning. In the absence 
of any reasons, the applicant was not able to understand why the Council had added its name 
in the list.  In particular, it was not able to establish whether the Council meant to take as the 
basis the Dutch terrorist law itself, or the court order or some other decision of which it had no 
knowledge. That state of uncertainty had been exacerbated by the fact that, before including 
its name in the list, the Council had refused the applicant’s request for access to related 
documents on the ground that disclosure would undermine the protection of the public interest 
as regards public security and international relations. The Council’s refusal may have led the 
applicant to consider that its inclusion in the list had been adopted having regard to 
confidential documents. 
191 In KONGRA-GEL the challenge was against a Council decision freezing the applicant’s 
assets for the first time whilst in Al Aqsa and PKK it was against a Council decision 
maintaining the freezing order. 
192 OMPI  and Al-Aqsa were heard by the Second Chamber whilst KONGRA-GEL and PKK 
where heard by the Seventh. Judge Forwood was a common judge in all the above cases and 
acted as juge rapporteur in KONGRA-GEL and PKK. 
193 Note however that in Sison, op.cit., which was decided on the same day as Al Aqsa, 
op.cit., the ECJ based the annulment as in OMPI on the combined violation of the right to a 
hearing, the requirement to give reasons and the right to judicial protection. 
194 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001  OJ L 145/43 regarding public access to European 
Parliament, Council and Commission documents. 
195 Joined Cases T-110/03, T-150/03 and T-405/03 Jose Maria Sison v Council [2005] ECR II-
01429. 
196 Ibid, paras 50-52 (holding that the particular interests affecting the requesting party cannot 
be taken into account when applying the exemptions contained in article 4 of the Regulation) 
See also  Sison (Case T-47/03), op cit, paras 209-210.  
197 In OMPI, in addition to challenging the validity of its inclusion in the list, the applicant also 
sought damages but its claim was rejected as inadmissible as it had failed to state the 
grounds on which the damages claim was based. 
 Although one has much sympathy with its 
findings on the facts, its reasoning raises questions. 
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Recalling settled case-law, the CFI pointed out that a failure to state reason was not 
in itself sufficient for the Community to incur in liability198. Conversely, a violation of 
the rights of defence may give rise to compensation199, provided that the existence of 
damage is proved, a casual link is established and, the violation is deemed 
sufficiently serious200. According to established case law, a serious breach occurs 
where the institution which has authored the act manifestly and gravely disregards 
the limits to its discretionary powers.201 The CFI considered that the breach of the 
applicant’s rights of defence was sufficiently serious but that, in the circumstances of 
the case, annulment was an adequate remedy. 202
The CFI also rejected the existence of causation
  
 
The CFI’s reasoning is problematic. It held that, in the circumstances, it was unable 
to form a view on whether there was such a manifest error. Given the lack of 
reasoning and the procedural irregularities that had been committed, it was unable to 
establish the basis on which the Council had decided to include the name of the 
applicant in the sanctions list. In particular, it was not clear whether the national 
competent authority on whose decision the Council relied was the Dutch Secretary of 
State or the Hague District Court. The CFI therefore could not form a judgment on 
whether, by including his name in the list, the Council had committed a manifest error 
of assessment.  
 
This reasoning, however, does not appear persuasive. Since the rule of law whose 
violation gave rise to the alleged damage was a procedural one, i.e. the right to a 
hearing, the seriousness of the breach must be determined not by reference to the 
substantive decision of the Council to include the applicant’s name in the list, but by 
reference to whether breach of the right to a hearing was in the circumstances of the 
case a serious violation. The judgment appears to apply the requirement pertaining 
to the intensity of violation to a rule other than that from which the alleged damage 
arose and thus confuse procedural rules and substantive standards. It would perhaps 
be preferable to take a bold stand to the effect that, given that the breach referred to 
a procedural rule, namely the right of defence, and the importance of the public 
interest involved, namely national security, in the circumstances of the case 
annulment was an adequate remedy.  
 
203
                                                        
198 Sison, op.cit. para 238. For previous case law, see e.g. Case 106/81 Kind v EEC [1982] 
ECR 2885, para14; Case C-119/88 AERPO and Others v Commission [1990] ECR I-2189; 
Case C-76/01 Eurocoton and Others v Council [2003] ECR I-10091, para 98; Case T-18/99 
Cordis v Commission [2001] ECR II-913, para 79. 
199 Ibid, 239. The case law accepts that the right to a hearing, in contrast to the requirement to 
give reasons, is a rule of law which is intended to grant right to individuals: see Case 
C-135/92 Fiskano v Commission [1994] ECR I-2885, paras 39-40; Joined Cases T-481/93 
and T-484/93 Exporteurs in Levende Varkens and Others v Commission [ECR] II-2941, para 
102. 
200 Case C-352/98 P, Laboratoires Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission [2000] ECR I-5291. 
201 See e.g. Case C-352/98 P Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission [2000] ECR I-5291. 
202 This was in fact stated by the CFI but Sison, para 241. 
203 In Hassan, where the sanctions list had been established by the UNSC and not by the EU 
itself a claim in damages was rejected, inter alia, on the ground that, even if there had been 
illegal conduct and loss, which the CFI rejected, such loss was causally connected not to the 
adoption of Community legislation but to the UNSC to which the legislation gave effect. 
. It held that there was no casual 
link between the alleged damage and the adoption of the contested Community 
measures. The alleged damages arose from a decision of the US Office of Foreign 
Assets Control dated 12 August 2002 and a decision of the Dutch Minister of Finance 
dated 13 August 2002 which had already ordered the freezing of the applicant’s 
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assets in the Netherlands. Likewise, the non-material damage caused by libelling the 
applicant as a terrorist could not be attributed to Community legislation, but to the 
Common Position, in relation to which the CFI lacked jurisdiction.204
In conclusion, although the CFI requires high procedural requirements in relation to 
decisions freezing funds, it has shown distaste for actions in damages. Allowing 
monetary relief would hinder excessively the discretion of the institutions in an area 
highly sensitive for the public interest. The rule of law is satisfied as long as 
applicants are entitled to prospective relief. Where the Council intends to re-adopt 
economic sanctions against successful applicants, it would only have to give them 
the opportunity to be heard and provide a sufficient notice
  
 
205
The imposition of economic sanctions may have collateral adverse effects on third 
parties. The ECJ and the ECtHR have perceived such effects as the inevitable 
consequence of pursuing public interest objectives. The locus classicus is 
Bosphorus
.  
 
Collateral effects on third parties 
 
206  where the ECJ held that the aims pursued by the sanctions against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was of such importance as to justify negative 
consequences even of a substantial nature for innocent commercial operators. In 
subsequent proceedings in Strasbourg, the ECtHR was content to defer to the 
choices of the ECJ and endorse its balance of the conflicting interests.207 In Ebony 
Maritime and Loten Navigation v Prefetto della Provincia di Brindisi and Others208 the 
ECJ held that Regulation No 990/93 implementing UN sanctions against 
Yugoslavia209 did not preclude an Italian law which provided for confiscation of the 
cargo where a vessel infringed the provisions of the Regulation even though the 
penalty of confiscation was imposed without any proof of fault on the part of the 
owner of the cargo. A similar approach has been taken by the ECtHR outside the 
sanctions field as regards the repercussions of restrictive state action on the property 
rights of third parties.210
                                                        
204 However, the rationale of the CFI seems at odd with its finding that the Council does not 
act circumscribed by the will of the Union or that of the Member States.  See OMPI, op cit, 
para 106 and Sison, op. cit, para 153. Indeed, it is not clear why any adverse effects on the 
applicant’s reputation can be attributed solely to the Common Position and not the 
implementing Community legislation. Insofar as the Union and the Community are distinct 
entities, both should bear liability for libelous statements. 
205 Prospective relief puts an end to an ongoing violation but does not seek deterrence. 
Arguably, damages should be available where the Council fails to comply with a previous 
ruling of the CFI. Otherwise, the Council may not be deterred from committing the same 
violation repeatedly.  A good example is provided by Case T-256/07, currently pending before 
the Court, where OMPI has brought a new action against an amended list on the grounds that 
the Council respected neither its right to a hearing nor the requirement to state reasons.  If the 
CFI sides again with the applicant, the option of claiming damages may be opened. In the 
case currently pending before the CFI, the applicants have not sought compensation.  
206 Op.cit. 
207 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v Ireland, Judgment of 30 June 2005. 
208 Case C-177/95 [1997] ECR I-1111. See also Case C-124/95 The Queen, ex p Centro-
Com v HM Treasury and Bank of England [1997] ECR I-81. 
209 Regulation No 990/93 concerning trade between the Community and the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia, OJ 1993 L 102, p. 14. 
210 See e.g. AGOSI v UK, [1986] 9 EHRR 1, and, especially, Gasus Dosier-Und Fördertechnik 
GmbH v Netherlands, [1995] 20 EHRR 403, where that seizure of a third party’s property to 
satisfy tax debts was held not to infringe the right to property. 
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The issue was recently revisited by the ECJ in Möllendorf.211 The applicants had 
entered into a contract for the sale of real estate but, after payment of the contractual 
price, the Land Registry refused to register the transfer on the ground that the buyer 
was included in the list of persons subject to economic sanctions under Regulation 
881/2002 implementing UNSC resolution 1390 (2002) against the Al-Qaeda 
network.212 The Court held that immovable property is an “economic resource”, and 
that registration of the transfer amounted to making such a resource available to a 
listed person within the meaning of Article 2(3) of the regulation.213
The judgment suggests that the ECJ will interpret a Community regulation heeding 
to, and closely following, the wording of the UNSC resolution to which it is intended to 
give effect.
 The Court 
interpreted Regulation 881/2002 in the light of the UNSC to which intended to give 
effect and came to the conclusion that Article 2(3) applies to any mode of making 
available an economic resource. It also held that the above finding was not affected 
by the fact that the contract of sale and the agreement on transfer of ownership had 
already been concluded before the buyer was included in the list. Such immediate 
effect flowed from Article 9 which stated that the regulation would apply 
notwithstanding any rights conferred by any contract entered into before its entry into 
force.  
214
                                                        
211 Case C-117/06 Möllendorf judgment of 11 October 2007. 
212 See above. 
213 Article 2(3) of Regulation 881/2002 states that no economic resource may be made 
available, directly or indirectly, to, or for the benefit of, a person or entity listed in Annex I, so 
as to enable that person or entity to obtain funds, goods or services. The sellers had argued 
that resources are made available within the meaning of Article 2(3) only where there is an 
economic imbalance between the consideration given and the assets purchased but, 
understandably, the Court had little sympathy for such a narrow interpretation of Article 2(3). 
Such an interpretation would not accord with the spirit of the financial sanctions for the 
following reasons: (a) it would require the court to determine on the facts of each case 
whether there was an economic balance in the transaction; (b) the very concept of “economic 
balance” would be difficult to define; (b) even if there was an economic imbalance in the 
transaction, it would be possible for a listed person to obtain an economic advantage by 
subsequently disposing of the property at a higher than the purchase price.  
214 See also to this effect Case C-84/95 Bosphorus [1996] ECR I-3953, paras 13 and 14, and 
Case C-371/03 Aulinger [2006] ECR I-2207, para 30. 
 Thus, the Court was reluctant to read any exceptions from the 
obligation to freeze assets provided for in Regulation 881/2002 which did not appear 
in its “parent” UNSC resolution.  
The effect of the Court’s findings in Möllendorf was that, since the completion of the 
property transfer was impossible, the sellers would be liable to repay the sale price to 
the buyers. The sellers argued that such liability made the sanctions incompatible 
with their fundamental right to property. The Court held that the question whether, in 
view of the special features of the case, such an obligation to make repayment might 
be a disproportionate infringement of the right to property could not alter the finding 
that the registration of the transfer was prohibited. It added, however, that the 
requirements flowing from the protection of fundamental rights are also binding on 
Member States when they implement Community rules, and that consequently they 
are bound, as far as possible, to apply the rules in accordance with those 
requirements. Accordingly, it was for the national court to determine whether, in view 
of the special features of the case, repayment of the monies received by the sellers 
would constitute a disproportionate infringement of their right to property and, if so, to 
apply the national legislation in question, as far as possible, so as to ameliorate those 
effects.  
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Conclusion 
 
Kadi and Al Barakaat can justly be seen as the most important judgment ever 
delivered by the ECJ on the relationship between European Community and 
international law, and one of its most important judgments on human rights. It is 
imbued by confidence, liberalism, and a somewhat sceptical view of international law. 
The ECJ entrenches the constitutional credentials of the EC Treaty asserting the 
autonomy of the Community legal order vis-à-vis the UN and also the European 
Convention for the Protection of Fundamental Rights.  
 
Whilst the judgment attracts attention mostly for its stance on the UN Charter and the 
crucial issue of fundamental rights, the issue of competence is, to use a solecism, the 
elephant in the courtroom. The present authors have expressed some skepticism as 
to whether the Community has competence to adopt economic sanctions against 
non-state actors. Community competence is unusually marginal in this case and 
requires a leap of faith. It is submitted that such a leap can be performed but it should 
be done on the basis of a teleological and evolutionary interpretation of Article 301 
EC, recognising its nature as a passerelle provision and the character of the EC 
Treaty as a living instrument, rather than on the basis of the judicial acrobatics of 
Article 308 EC. The reasoning of the ECJ, and also the CFI, in this respect do not 
appear wholly persuasive. Kadi singularly illustrates the fundamental tension 
between, on the one hand, the principle of enumerated competences and, on the 
other hand, the functionality of political decision-making. The first is necessary for the 
Community to exist, since otherwise Member States would not agree to share their 
sovereignty, but the second is necessary for the Community to be useful. The EU 
judiciary has to struggle with this conundrum. Kadi reminds us, lest we forget, a truth 
familiar to constitutional lawyers on both sides of the Atlantic, namely that an 
instrumental rationale is a sine qua non of judicial constitution building. 
 
On the reception of international law into the Community legal order, the difference 
between the ECJ and the CFI could not be more striking. The CFI placed Community 
law in a firm hierarchy of international law norms at the apex of which stands the UN 
Charter. In doing so, it promoted a systemic vision of international law as a coherent 
legal order215
The CFI’s approach is problematic. On the one hand, it asserts Community 
competence to implement UNSC resolutions but, on the other hand, it reduces 
protection for EU citizens or at least provides for a level of protection which may be 
lower than that guaranteed by the national constitutions. By opting for competence 
without protection, it reinforces a model of supra-national government which begs 
legitimacy. In fact, the issue of competence and the issue of fundamental rights 
protection are inextricably linked and the answer to the first predetermines the 
answer to the second: either the Community has competence to impose sanctions on 
 at the expense of denying the Community its own enclosed 
constitutional universe. This way, the CFI guaranteed the EU external legitimacy 
voicing the concerns of sovereign actors: Since the EU is itself a creature of 
international law, how can it ignore the UN Charter which stands above all other 
international agreements? The ECJ, by contrast, opted for internal legitimacy, 
addressing the citizenry: Within the EU constitutional space, the Council cannot act in 
violation of fundamental rights no matter what is the ultimate source of a measure. In 
this model, the EU is a self-contained order, whose highest constitutional norms 
determine irrevocably the outer limits of its competence.  
 
                                                        
215 For a theoretical discussion of this approach and its implications, see E. Benvenisti, The 
Conception of International Law as a Legal System, Tel Aviv University Law Faculty Papers, 
Paper 83, 2008. 
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individuals, in which case Community human rights standards apply, or the matter is 
to be left entirely to the Member States to deal with.  
 
The ECJ’s commitment is preferable. The primacy of the Charter operates in the field 
of international law. The effect of international obligations within the Community legal 
order must be determined by reference to conditions set by Community law, and no 
provision of the Treaty abrogates the application of fundamental rights. Article 307, in 
particular, may not take precedence over fundamental rights, the protection of which 
the ECJ ensures in fulfilling its function under Article 220 of the Treaty. As Maduro 
AG aptly put it, Article 307 may not grant UNSC resolutions with a “supra-
constitutional” status. The ECJ established the “constitutional hegemony”216 of EU 
law echoing the principle of the US Supreme Court that “no agreement with a foreign 
nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any other branch of Government, 
which is free from the restraints of the Constitution”.217
The CFI findings in OMPI appear to strike an acceptable balance. On the one hand, 
the CFI is keen to assert the application of procedural rights and confirm that any 
concept of emergency constitution is internalised, i.e. remains subject to the 
prerequisites for human rights protection provided for by the Community legal order. 
On the other hand, it recognises that exceptions may be required with regard to the 
disclosure of evidence to the parties in order to accommodate concerns pertaining to 
the nature and sources of evidence. The scope of these exceptions is to be policed 
 
 
The ECJ views its task as being to draw a balance between legitimate security 
concerns about the nature and sources of evidence and the process rights of the 
individual. In doing so, it appeared to concede limited ground that the sanctions 
originated from the UNSC. It accepted that the Community must respect international 
law and, in that context, attach “special importance” to UNSC resolutions but this did 
not translate to granting any special status to Community measures adopted to 
comply with such resolutions when reviewing their compatibility with fundamental 
rights. Similarly, the ECJ accepted that it must balance “legitimate security concerns” 
and heed to “overriding considerations to do with safety or the conduct of the 
international relations of the Community and its Member States” but by doing so, it 
emphasized the nature of the interests at stake rather than the UNSC as their 
ultimate exponent.  
 
The ECJ did not consider that the interests at stake, namely international security, 
justified a lower standard of review. It is however somewhat strange that the Court 
approached due process by reference to the right to a hearing and the right to 
property but made no express reference to the requirement to give reasons. In view 
of the limitations applicable to the right to a hearing in anti-terrorist cases, the duty of 
public authorities to provide reasons becomes the key component of the right to 
judicial protection.  
 
In OMPI and the other cases pertaining to sanctions lists drawn by the Community 
institutions and not by the UNSC, the CFI articulated the requirements of due 
process in more detail than the ECJ did in Kadi. The reason for this may be that the 
emphasis in each set of cases lay in different aspects. In Kadi the ECJ was 
preoccupied with asserting the rule of law and the existence of judicial review over 
Community action dictated by the UNSC. In OMPI, by contrast, free from the 
constraints of UN concrete lists, the CFI was preoccupied with the detailed 
requirements of procedural rights.  
 
                                                        
216 Spyro, op.cit., above. 
217 Reid v Covert 354 U.S.1, 16 (1957). 
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jealously by the judiciary. The CFI exercises procedural review, its intervention 
seeking to reinforce the legitimacy of anti-terrorist measures without putting into 
question the underpinning substantive policies. Drawing the balance between 
security and freedom remains a challenge for the judiciary of our times.  
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